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THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT OVER
CORPORATE LITIGATION: A STUDY
IN INHERENT AGENCY
ROGER J. GOEBEL t
INTRODUCTION

ITdirectors
is a traditional rule of corporate law that the board of

exercises plenary power over corporate management. In fact, however, the twentieth century has witnessed a decided shift of the functional center of authority
to the corporate officers. Although a basic residuum of
authority remains in the board of directors, the officers,
especially the president, in the majority of corporations
exercise the day-to-day control of corporate affairs;' In
practice the modern corporation is occasionally directed by
a general manager, but more often by the president (or
perhaps, to use a mode currently in vogue for large publicissue corporations, the chairman of the board),2 who either
is given express general managerial authority or simply
assumes general supervision tantamount to such authority
over corporate affairs.
Technically, the president or other officer exerting
managerial authority is an agent of the corporation. His
powers should, then, be derived either directly from the
constitution or by-laws, or indirectly as a sub-agent from
delegation of authority by the board of directors. But
for over a century, and ever more frequently in recent

IAssociate in Law, University of California School of Law; Member
of the New York Bar.
1For the standard legal rules requiring a residuum of authority in the
board, but permitting virtually wholesale delegation to managing agents and
officers, see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 46, 48 (rev. ed. 1946); 1 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTIcE §§ 511, 514 (1959); LA'rINx, CORioRAiomNs 222-23 (1959). On the modern extent of such delegation, see
Kempin, The Corporate Officer and the Law of Agency, 44 VA. L. REV.
1273, 1277-83 (1959).
2 See 1 HORNSxEIN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 514.
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years, the courts have also referred to the inherent authority,
or powers ex virtute officiis, of the president. What precisely is the nature of this authority? The opinions are

generally obscure as to whether this terminology is merely
a cloak for traditional agency principles in somewhat unusual
corporate settings, or is intended to indicate a quite distinct
substantive authority. The commentators seem to recognize

inherent authority or ex officio powers of the president
as a distinct category of agency power, but are unfortunately
imprecise as to its nature and scope.'
The matter is not one of purely academic significance,
a mere quibble over semantics. Recognition of some inherent authority in the president, indigenous rather than
derived from the board of directors, can create considerable
functional consequences. It would represent legal acceptance of independent operations by the president on behalf
of the corporation, regardless of board direction and to
some degree despite board division or even opposition. The
pragmatic difference such recognition can make has been
recently high-lighted in a series of cases, notably in New
York from Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen
Corp.' to West -View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp.,5
32 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 553 (rev. ed.
1954) refers to it as inherent power, and BALLANTINE, op. Cit. sUpra note 1,

§51 terms it ex virtute officii power, but neither defines its character.
1 HORNSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 514, suggests that this power, termed
ex officio, belongs only to the president who is also general manager, which
inferentially makes it a derivative of general agency authority. 2
'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRAcTicE §8.05 & n. 36 (1958) identifies
the inherent authority of a corporate president with the inherent authority
or general agency power of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENcY (1958).
Kempin, supra note 1, at 1282, would appear also to identify it with the
Restatement sense. So far as student material is concerned, Note, Inherent
Power as a Basis of a Corporate Officer's Authority to Contract, 57 COLUm.
L. REv. 868 (1957), and Note, Inherent Powers of Corporate Presidents,
23 WASH. U.L.Q. 117 (1937), are not always clear but appear to conclude
that inherent authority is generally merely an application of broad implied
and apparent authority. Note, Implied Powers of the Corporate President.
40 Ky. L.J. 184 (1952), never reaches this theoretical issue. Note, Inherent
Powers of Corporate Officers: Aeed for a Statutory Definition, 61 HARV. L.
REV. 867, 870-71 (1948), definitely concludes that there is an inherent power
distinct from traditional agency implied or apparent authority, hut confesses
that the character of this power is obscure.
4298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d 790 (1949).
5 6 N.Y.2d 344, 160 N.E.2d 622, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1959).
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which deal with the power of the president to conduct
corporate litigation in the face of a deadlock among the
directors or the tacit opposition of a majority of them.
The lack of clarity among courts and commentators
over the character of the inherent power of the president
may have resulted in part from the attempt to derive a
general rule from a multitude of heterogeneous fact situations.' Accordingly, this article will, after a necessary
initial presentation of the general rules governing presidential authority to bind the corporation, concentrate on a
specific case pattern: the power of the president to institute,
defend, or conduct corporate litigation.
Selection of this case pattern has immediate practical
value because of the relative frequency with which it has
occurred in recent litigation. From an analytic point of
view, isolation of this particular pattern not only appreciably
narrows the field of inquiry, but also refines the conflict
of interests by substantially excluding those of parties
outside the corporation itself. It is comparatively rare that
a third party can claim to have relied to his injury upon
the president's power over litigation. Finally, in terms of
academic theory, those cases in which the power of the
president to litigate is challenged on the ground of a division
of authority in the internal corporate management, serve
as a unique focus upon the character and merits of inherent
authority.
It is essential at the outset to have a clear grasp of
the recognized principles of agency. The Restatement
(Second) of Agency defines three categories: (real) authority, apparent authority, and inherent authority. Authority,
often called real or actual authority, grants the agent the
power to bind the principal in accordance with the principal's
manifestations to the agent.7 Authority may be express,
that is, explicitly granted, or implied. Implied authority
may result 1) from the reasonable construction by the agent
of the powers implicit in the express terms of his grant
6
7

Cf. Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 867 (1948).
RESTATEMENT

(SEcON.D),

AGENCY

§ 7 (1958).
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of authority, or 2) from a course of past dealings or from
trade or customary usages related to the express grant.
Apparent authority gives the agent the power to bind
the principal by virtue of the principal's manifestations to
third parties of the extent of the agent's powers.8 It rests
on the reasonable belief of the third party, due to manifestations by the principal, that the agent has powers which
were not in fact accorded to him. In some circumstances
the agent himself may make the binding manifestations of
power to the third party, provided the principal knows
of and acquiesces in such manifestations. In terms of this
definition, there can be no such thing as apparent authority
binding an undisclosed principal.
The concept of inherent authority represents Professor
Warren Seavey's substantial contribution to the theory of
agency.' It is defined as the power of the agent to bind
the principal arising solely from the agency relation itself,
and existing for the protection of third parties harmed by
or dealing with a servant or other agent.10 The Restatement
sharply distinguishes inherent authority from apparent authority, because in the former there need be no manifestation
by the principal to the third party; indeed, the principal
may be undisclosed. The most common illustration of inherent authority is the doctrine of respondeat superior in
tort liability.
In the field of contractual liability, the Restatement
describes only three categories of cases in which the principal
is bound by inherent authority: 1) A general agent does
something similar to what he is authorized to do, but in
violation of orders. 1 Example: A broker in grain who
gives a customary trade warranty although the principal
forbade him to do so. 2) An agent acts purely for his
8Id at 8. The Restatement in comment d distinguishes apparent authority from estoppel, which requires reliance by the third party, but courts
usually do not, and the distinction is not material for the purposes of this
article.
9 The theory was first elaborately presented in Seavey, Agency Powers,
1 OKLA. L. Rav. 3 (1948).
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 8A (1958).
11 Id. at §§ 161, 161A, 194.
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own purposes in entering a transaction authorized if he
were actuated by the proper motive. 2 Example: An agent
makes a contract for a loan on behalf of the principal,
having previously formed the intent to steal the money.
3) An agent is authorized to dispose of goods, but departs
from the authorized manner in which the goods are to be
disposed." Example: A principal gives an agent a painting
with instructions to sell it, but only to a museum. The
agent sells instead to a private collector.
In terms of academic theory, the question immediately
arises: what relation does the inherent authority of the
corporate president have to the types of inherent authority
in agency above described? It is clear that each of the
varieties recognized by the Restatemeat rests upon a policy
of protection for an innocent third party who will be
injured unless the requisite authority, never granted by
the principal, is nonetheless imputed to the agent. But
query, is this the reason for according inherent authority
to a corporate president? The suspicion arises that in
corporate law this authority, whatever its nature, is accorded
at least to some extent to benefit the corporation rather
than any third party. We shall see whether or not this
suspicion is accurate in considering 1) the powers of the
president to bind the corporation generally, 2) the powers
of the president in the conduct of litigation, 3) the powers
of the president in the conduct of litigation when there is
internal corporate division.
I.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE CORPORATE PRESIDENT
IN GENERAL

Power to Bind by Contract
It is not possible to set forth the scope of obligational
authority accorded by the law to the corporate president
with any degree of dogmatic certainty.
Courts quite
12 Id. at §§ 165, 262.
13 Id. at §§ 175, 201.
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naturally are more concerned with arriving at sound results
in varying factual circumstances than with spinning a neat
pattern of legal doctrine. There are many formulations
of the president's powers among the states, and they are
not always applied with precise constancy even within
the same jurisdiction. A major cause of this condition is
the fact that the law in this area is in a process of growth
and adjustment to the requirements of corporate reality.
Creative evolution bars pat definition.
The first and basic distinction drawn by the authorities
is between the president who is simultaneously general manager, and the president who is not. As a rule of law,
this distinction is in the process of erosion; as a ground
rule for intelligent discussion, it is probably still essential.
The president-general manager has the status of a general
agent, and can bind the corporation by any act done in the
ordinary course of business operations. Broadly speaking, he can bind the corporation by any act related in some
degree to the corporate ends. As for the office of president
as such, there are two opposing views. The older, more
narrow conception holds the president strictly to powers
delegated by the board of directors. Outside of these, he
has no more authority than any other member of the board
of directors. The more modern, broad view recognizes the
president as the normal functional head of the business.
This rule accordingly gives him a prima facie authority
to bind the corporation by any act within the normal scope
of its operations.
The President-General Manager
Before discussing the scope of authority of the presidentgeneral manager, it would seem advisable to state the legal
position of the general manager as such. A general manager is a general agent,1 4 that is, one granted authority
to govern all the operations of a total business or some
substantial unit thereof. The delegation of express powers

14

Id. at § 73.
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by the principal is always broad, and usually in expansive
rather than limited terms. The general manager is accordingly quite free in construing additional derivative powers
from those granted." Additional implied authority arises
through customary practices in the business itself and
through trade usages in general. The cumulative effect of
such extensive derivative authority has been succinctly stated
by the Delaware Supreme Court: "A general manager is,
as the term indicates, a manager for all the general purposes
of the corporation, and has implied authority to do anything that the corporation could do in the general scope
and operation of its business." 1' Finally, based upon the
operative authority which the corporation permits the general manager to assume, an equally broad apparent authority
is engendered to protect third parties reasonably relying
7
upon it.'
An initial reaction might find such sweeping implied
and apparent authority almost limitless. But this is to
overstate the case. In practice, many courts restrain the
authority to that which "is usual and necessary in the
ordinary course of business actually followed by the corporation." 11 So held the Arizona Supreme Court in an
often cited decision holding that the manager of a clinic
had neither implied nor apparent authority to guarantee
a distinguished physician minimum earnings for two years
as an inducement to join the staff. The Ohio court reacted
likewise in refusing to find that a building corporation
manager, authorized to seek buyers for the corporate stock,

15Petition of Mulco Prods., Inc., 50 Del. (11 Terry) 28, 123 A.2d 95
(Super. Ct.), aff'd sub nor. Mulco Prods., Inc. v. Black, 50 Del. (11
Terry) 246, 127 A.2d 851 (1956).
16 Phoenix Fin. Corp. v. Iowa-Wis. Bridge Co., 41 Del. (2 Terry) 130,
139-40, 16 A.2d 789, 793 (1940).
17Curtis Land & Loan Co. v. Interior Land Co., 137 Wis. 341, 118
N.W. 853 (1908).
18Lois Grunow Mer. Clinic v. Davis, 49 Ariz. 277, 286-87, 66 P.2d
238, 242 (1937). See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, supra note 3, at § 56 (rev.
ed. 1946), for additional cases. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 73,
comment b (1958).
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thereby acquired implied authority to sell the building
itself. 9
Other courts, however, raise presumptions of authority
so broad that it is extremely difficult for the corporation to
defeat them. Rules that "the powers of the managing officers
of a corporation are coextensive with those of the principal
except in relation to matters over which the stockholders
alone have control," 20 or that the manager's powers are
coextensive with the general scope of the business, 21 or
that the manager has prima facie power to do anything
the board of directors could authorize or ratify, 22 suggest
that the doctrinal limits of implied authority are being
surpassed. Fletcher's Private Corporations' survey of the
cases comes to the conclusion that a general manager has
authority to dd any act or make any contract within the
scope of ordinary corporate business, and any limits placed
on him of which third parties have no notice will not
diminish his authority. 3 This is essentially the same as
the first variety of inherent authority presented by the
Restatement noted at the outset of this article.24 Whatever
the theoretical justification, however, the practical implications of such an extensive imputation of power are clear.
The scope of authority of the president-general manager
is of course the same as that of the general manager alone.
The formula varies from jurisdiction to jurisdictionauthority to do any act or make any contract appropriate
in the ordinary course of business,2" to make any contract
19 Miller v. Wick Bldg. Co., 150 Ohio St. 93, 93 N.E.2d 467 (1950);
accord. Sterling v. Trust Co., 149 Va. 867, 141 S.E. 856 (1928).
20 Coe v. American Fruit Growers, 164 Ore. 90, 96, 100 P.2d 234, 236-37

(1940).

21 Petition of Mulco

Prods., Inc., supra note 15; Wells-Dickey Co. v.

Embody, 82 Mont. 150, 266 Pac. 869 (1928).
22 Victory Inv. Corp. v. Muskogee Elec. Traction Co., 150 F.2d 889
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945)
23 2

FLETCHER,

CYCLOPEDIA

OF

PRIVATE

(applying Oklahoma law).
§ 594 (rev. ed.

CORPORATIONS

1954).
24 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.

The conclusion that the

general manager's authority to do any act within the scope of the business

is inherent authority is also reached by Kempin, The Corporate Officer and
the Low of Agency. 44 VA. L. RE,. 1273, 1277-82 (1958), and in the
Note. 61 HARv. L. REv. 867, 868 (1948).
23 Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Pacific Grace Prods. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 634,
290 P.2d 481 (1955) ; Marron v. Wood, 55 N.M. 367, 233 P.2d 1051 (1951).
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to fulfill corporate purposes, 26 to do anything which the
board of directors can authorize or ratify2 7 -but the underlying principle remains the same. Since the presidentgeneral manager has functional control of all aspects of the
business, issues the directives which regulate its internal
regime, and conducts personally or through agents the relations with the outside world, it is only just that he bind
the corporation by any act or contract reasonably related
to the corporate economy.
The only question then is how remote from the corporate
economy an act or contract must be before it ceases to be
binding upon the corporation? Obviously, none of the
formulations above provide absolute lines of demarcation,
and the actual decision will be heavily fact-oriented. Attempts by the corporation to use a standard saving clause,
i. e., that the general manager shall exercise full control
"subject to the orders of the board of directors," as a
defense in subsequent litigation get short shrift in modern
cases. Unless the directors intervene actively to exercise
this limitation, the courts regard the president-general manager as fully competent.2" The only genuine limitation is
that a contract deemed unusual or extraordinary does not
bind the corporation.2 9 Even here past custom within the
firm can render a superficially unusual act authorized. °
What is unusual or extraordinary can only be determined
by factual analysis of the individual corporation's practices,
in conjunction with the trade usages, with whichever is
the greater setting the outer limit. 1 Appraising the decisions
20 Hobbs v. Homes, Inc., 246 Iowa 1195, 71 N.W.2d 592 (1955).
27Fletcher Oil Co. v. City of Bay City, 346 Mich. 411, 78 N.W.2d 205
(1956); Barnett v. Kennedy, 185 Okla. 409, 92 P.2d 963 (1938); C. L.
McClain Fuel Corp. v. Lineinger, 341 Pa. 364, 19 A.2d 478'(1941). For a
general survey, see 2 FLETCHER, supra note 23 at § 594.
2 Blue Goose Mining Co. v. Northern Light Mining Co., 245 Fed. 727
(9th Cir. 1917); Phoenix Fin. Corp. v. Iowa-Wis. Bridge Co., 41 Del.
(2 Terry) 130, 16 A.2d 789 (1940) (secretary-treasurer-general manager).
291Bacon Piano Co. v. Medcalf Jewelry & Music Co., 225 Mo. App. 463,
40 S.W.2d 762 (1931); see 1 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 514 (1959).
30Rock Wool Insulating Co. v. Huston, 141 Colo. 13, 346 P.2d 576
(1959).
31 Kempin, mtpra note 24, at 1278-79, citing cases at 1279 n.17.
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as a whole, there is a distinct trend toward making it
extremely difficult for a firm to deny contractual liability for
the conduct of its president-general manager, with the sweep
of language in some cases suggesting that something more
implied or apparent authority is the ultimate
than normal
32
rationale.

It is time to return to the validity of the distinction
between the president who is general manager and the
president who is not. As a current rule of law, it is
probably true that the president-general manager has a
broader range of authority than one who holds the presidency alone, 33 and this condition will undoubtedly continue
in states which limit the president as such to the level of
any other director.3 4 But elsewhere the distinction is being
undermined. One factor is that courts find it increasingly
desirable to imply the status of general manager, either by
construction of some express grant of power,35 or more often
by inferring it from the manner in which the president
has been allowed to conduct business transactions. 3 6 More
significant is the tendency simply to attribute to the office
of the presidency powers approximating those of a general
manager, on the theory, expressed as long ago as 1902 by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, that in fact "presidents of
corporations well-nigh universally exercise the power of a
32Barnett v. Kennedy, supra note 27, at 414, 92 P.2d at 968; C. L.
McClain Fuel Cori. v. Lineinger, supra note 27, at 368, 19 A.2d at 480;
cf. Diederich v. Wisconsin Wood Prods., Inc., 247 Wis. 212, 216-17, 19
N.W.2d 268, 271 (1945), where the court found apparent authority to
contract on the basis of a rather equivocal letter, despite a specific subsequent prohibition by the board of directors. Heavy stress was laid on the
appearance created by the implied power of the president-general manager,
which the court said extended to any act the corporation could do in its
ordinary business.
'3Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Pacific Grape Prods. Co., supra note 25;
Diederich v. Wisconsin Wood Prods., Inc., supra note 32.
34Kelly v. Citizens Fin. Co., 306 Mass. 531, 28 N.E.2d 1005 (1940):
Goodenouzh's Adm'x v. Vermont-People's Nat'l Bank, 106 Vt. 5, 168 Atl.
914 (1933): cf. Kempin, The Corporate Officer and the Lazy of Agency,
44 \7A. L. RXvx. 1273, 1277-78 (1958).
35 P. Curtis Ko Eune Co. v. Manayunk Yarn Mfg. Co., 260 Pa. 340,

103 Atl. 720 (1918).
36 PDIC v. Beakley Corp., 124 N.J.L. 445, 448, 12 A.2d 700, 702
(Ct. Err. & App. 1940); accord, Jacksonville Am. Pub. Co. v. Jacksonville
Paper Co., 143 Fla. 835, 197 So. 672 (1940): C. L. McClain Fuel Corp. v.
Lineinger, 341 Pa. 364, 19 A.2d 478 (1941).
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general agent.
."
To appreciate the extent of this
tendency requires an analysis of the current status of the
office of the president in se, to which we now turn.
Authority of the President
The two alternative rules have already been indicatedthe president has no more power than any other director
versus the president has personal authority to obligate the
firm within the normal scope of its business. Corporate
law authorities generally declare that the older narrow rule
still obtains in a slight majority of jurisdictions, but their
categories of cases hopelessly conflict with one another."8
This is not surprising because, as noted before, the diversity
of formulae and the heterogeneity of fact situations make
clear categorization almost impossible. However, there is
agreement that the trend is toward the broader rule, and
that this is desirable because more in accord with com39
mercial realities and the expectations of the lay public.
The older, narrower concept of the president's authority
stems from a nineteenth-century policy opinion that corporations should be favored and their assets protected from
unnecessary invasion. This could be attained by requiring
the utmost regularity in internal corporate operations, and
holding the officers strictly to the more or less express grants
of authority in the by-laws or board resolutions. This policy
consideration has largely disappeared in the wake of our
present view of the corporation as the subject of considerable
St. Clair v. Rutledge, 115 Wis. 583, 592, 92 N.W. 234, 237 (1902).
The basic state-by-state compendium is in 2 FLrCHER, CycIoPEznA OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 560-91.1 (rev. ed. 1954).
Compare with this
survey and each other the lists in BALLANTINE CORPORATIONS § 51 (rev. ed.
37

38

1946); 1 HORNSTEIN,

CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE

§§ 513-14

(1959);

Note, 40 Ky. L.J. 184, 186-87 nn.7-9 (1952); Note, 50 YALE L.J. 348, 35152 nn.23-24 (1940).
392 FLETCHER, supra note 38, at 558, criticizes the narrow rule for
failing to protect the public in dealings with the corporation.
LATTIN,
228-29 (1959) and 2 0'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW
AND PRACTICE §8.05 (1958) cite approvingly the trend toward giving the
president general managerial powers. In accord are Kempin, mtpra note 34,
CORPORATIONS

at 1281-83; Notes, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 868, 885 (1957); 40 Ky. L.J. 184,
191-92 (1952); 50 YALE L.J. 348, 350 (1940).
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social obligations, bearing the risks of social intercourse
whenever the public interest so demands, but more traditionally-minded courts find the narrow concept a still useful
tool.
Doctrinairily, the strict rule, whose hallmark is the
slogan that the president as such has no more powers than
any other director,4 follows simple agency principles. All
the powers of the president must come from: 1) "the organic
law of the corporation"
the by-laws and basic resolutions, 2) explicit directives from the board, 3) construction
of the express powers granted, 4) implication from usage,
custom, and the nature of the company's business.4
The
last source is obviously the most elastic, and with judicious
stretching might well reach the same extent as the broad
rule's formulation of presidential authority within the ordinary scope of the business.48 The critical factor is that
the more strict courts cast a jaundiced eye on easy implication, and place upon the plaintiff the burden of
establishing the custom in the business from which the
challenged authority is to be derived.4 Certainly there is
no possibility that these more tradition-oriented courts will
impute to the president any inherent powers, unless he is also
general manager.4 5
From the practitioner's viewpoint, it would be easy to
condemn this narrow rule as antiquated and doomed to
'-

40 Dent v. Peoples Bank, 118 Ark. 157, 175 S.W. 1154 (1915);
Betz v.
Tacoma Drug Co., 15 Wash. 2d 471, 131 P.2d 183 (1942).
41 First Nat'l Bank v. Cement Prods. Co., 209 Iowa 358, 360, 227 N.W.
908, 909 (1929).
42 See Horowitz v. S. Slater & Sons, Inc., 265 Mass. 143, 164 N.E. 72
(1928);
Betz v. Tacoma Drug Co., supra note 40.
43
Thus, A. J. McMahan & Co. v. Hibbard, 182 Okla. 503, 78 P.2d 409
(1937), and Kelly, Murray, Inc. v. Lansdowne Bank & Trust Co., 299
Pa. 236, 149 At. 190 (1930), have been cited as following both the strict
and the broad rules.
44 E.g., Grant v. Duluth, M. & N. Ry., 66 Minn. 349, 352, 69 N.W. 23,
24 (1896): "As presidents of corporations very frequently exercise . . .
wider powers than those given them by the articles and by-laws of the
corporation, courts . . . have usually adopted a very liberal rule in favor

of persons contracting with such officers, whenever there was evidence reasonably tending to show that it had been the custom . . . ." (Emphasis

added.) The plaintiff here lost $16,000 through his inability to prove such
a custom.
45 See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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extinction-too easy, and rather inaccurate. Short of creating absolute liability, some dike must be erected to protect
the corporation from a flood of unforeseen obligations incurred by the acts of its president, properly motivated or
not. Jurisdictions adopting the broader implication of
presidential authority use the device of a denial of this
presumption of authority to unusual or extraordinary contracts. Courts in a more traditional vein achieve the same
goal by denying any presumption of authority at the outset, and then carefully construing the real delegation of
power to reach what are often eminently sensible results.4 6
There is no hesitation in a proper case to find for the third
party.4 7 However, it is unfortunately true that adherence
to strict agency can have something of the same effect
in this area as donning a pair of blinkers. It is not hard
to find instances in which the strict rule operates so
rigorously as to confound the reasonable expectations of
innocent third parties, while the broader rule would bring
warranted relief.4"
Both because it enables greater flexibility in practical
operation and because it poses more interesting issues for
analysis, the rule that the president has some powers by
virtue of his office alone deserves more attention. This rule
is also derived from the nineteenth century, but has really
flowered in more recent years through more frequent
application. It commences from a different policy premise.
46

Lewis v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 240 Iowa 1249, 37 N.W.2d
316 (1949) (contract for lifetime employment); Kroeger v. Brody, 130
Ohio St. 559, 200 N.E. 836 (1936) (unique preferential loan agreement);
Betz v. Tacoma Drug Co., supra note 40 (sale of substantial corporate
property).
47 Homesteaders' Life Ass'n v. Salinger, 212 Iowa 251, 235 N.W. 485
(1931);
A. J. McMahan & Co. v. Hibbard, supra note 43.
48
Compare Du Bois-Matlack Lumber Co. v. Henry D. Davis Lumber
Co., 149 Ore. 571, 42 P.2d 152 (1935) (no liability on promissory note), with
Italo-Petroleum Corp. of America v. Hannigan, 40 Del. (1 Terry) 534,
14 A.2d 401 (1940) (liability); and Grant v. Duluth, M. & N. Ry., supra
note 44 (no liability on guarantee of excess expenses in a construction
contract), w.ith Pegram-West, Inc., v. Winston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 231 N.C.
277, 56 S.E.2d 607 (1949) (liability on additional mortgage guarantee for
construction); and Dent v. Peoples Bank, supra note 40 (no liability for
fee of a general counsel), with Winfield Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Robinson,
89 Kan. 842, 132 Pac. 979 (1913) (liability for counsel fee).
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The president is deemed the usual functional head of most
corporations, because most matters are too pressing to await
intermittent board of directors' attention.
The dealing
public has come to expect that presidents exercise such
leadership, and rely upon it in transactions with the corporation without demanding overt indicia of board approval.
Therefore, both to accommodate the normal practice of
modern corporations and to justify the general anticipations
of the public, it is desirable to impute to the president some
incidental authority by virtue of his office.
Most courts and commentators refer to this incidental
authority as inherent, or as powers ex virtute officii. Since
we must still maintain the caveat that it is uncertain
whether this means a broad implied or an inherent authority
(as the terms are used in the Restatement), for shorthand reference it will be called the broad rule. The leading
Delaware case, Italo-Petroleum Corp. of America v. Hannigan, well enunciates it as the rule that the president "is
presumed to have, by virtue of his office, certain more or
less limited powers in the transaction of the usual and
ordinary business of the corporation." "
This expression
reveals two features of interest: the incidental authority
is 1) presumptive, and 2) limited.
To take the topic of limitation first, the formula restricting presidential authority to acts in the ordinary course
of business is probably the most common °
Somewhat
broader formulations extend this authority to "contracts
made . . . within the scope of . . . the corporation's
legitimate purposes" ' 1 any act done in furthering corporate objectives,5 2 or "any contract pertaining to the cor-

49

Supra note 48 at 545, 14 A.2d at 406.

50 Pettit v. Doeskin Prods., Inc., 270 F.2d, 95 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,

362 U.S. 910 (1960) (applying N.Y. Law); Kline v. Thompson, 206 Wis.
464, 240 N.W. 128 1932); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 51 (rev. ed. 1946).
The New York formulation is: "The president, as managing agent, may,
in the absence of restrictions, make such ordinary contracts as custom
and the necessities of business would justify or require." Hardin v. Morgan
Lithograph Co., 247 N.Y. 332, 338-39, 160 N.E. 388, 390 (1928).
51 Gardner v. The Calvert, 253 F.2d 395, 398 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 960 (1958) (admiralty, federal law).
52 Halbert v. Berlinger, 127 Cal. App. 2d 6, 17, 273 P.2d 274, 280 (1954).
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porate affairs." 11 The last is the variation favored in
Illinois, which has been probably the most influential jurisdiction in the promotion of ex officio authority. 4 The
statement that the president may perform any act which
the board of directors could authorize," popular in describing
the gamut of the president-general manager's authority, is
not often used for the president only. The most immediate
observation of these formulations is that there is little
critical difference *from those used to descry the limits
of the president-general manager's powers, and indeed they
are not infrequently stated to apply
to the president or
general manager in the alternative. 6 This raises the practical question whether or not beyond the umbra of acts
within the president's powers there still remains a penumbra
of acts within the authority of a president-general manager
alone. A little extrapolation suggests that if such a penumbra still exists, it is doomed to eventual oblivion.
Now, what are the effective limits of the president's
powers? The standard rule here, as for the presidentgeneral manager, would winnow out unusual or extraordinary contracts-the same fact-oriented test with the
same difficulty of generalization. Vague as it may sound,
though, this is a very real restraint. It received its greatest
prominence when proclaimed by Judge Learned Hand in
Schwartz v. United Merchants 4 Mfrs. Inc.,15 noteworthy
because with one blow it relegated to the past the New
York rule authorizing any act which the board of directors
could ratify, because it was not readily amenable to the
unusual act approach. Judge Hand's decision barred a
contract to make the plaintiff an exclusive sales agent with
high commissions. Other frequently voided extraordinary
53 George E. Lloyd & Co. v. Matthews, 223 Ill.
477, 480,. 79 N.E. 172,
173 (1906); accord, Grummet v. Fresno Glazed Cement Pipe Co., 181 Cal.
509, 185 Pac. 388 (1919).
54 See Notes, 57 COLUm. L. REv. 868, 876-79 (1957); 23 WASH. U.L.Q.
117, 117-24 (1937).
5G Adams v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 73 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1934); see
Patterson v. Robinson, 116 N.Y. 193, 22 N.E. 372 (1889).
56 Adams v. Barron G. Gollier, Inc., .supra note 55, at 979; Chalverus v.
Wilson Mfg. Co., 212 Ga. 612, 613, 94 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1956).
57 72 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1934).
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contracts include: hiring of a sales agent who would receive
an interest in the corporate profits, 58 making a lifetime
employment contract, 59 transfer of corporate assets,60 and
purchase of or merger with another corporation."
But how high a hurdle is the unusual acts doctrine
today? There are already cases holding that corporate
acquiesence can vitiate the limit: "when a corporation
allows its president to assume complete control over the
affairs of the corporation he then does have, prima facie,
the power to make . . . [an extraordinary contract]."

62

Even more significant is the fact that, as Judge Medina
has recently noted, the range of unusual acts and contracts
is steadily narrowing under the impact of modern corporate existence in which "third parties commonly .
[rely] on the authority of such officials in almost all the
multifarious transactions in which corporations . . . [enThe pace of modern business life . . . [is] too
gage].

swift to insist on the approval by the board of directors
of every transaction that .

.

. [is] in any way 'unusual.'

"

1

There is ample case law to warrant such an appraisal."
It provides the basis for an educated guess that eventually
only acts radically unrelated to the corporate economy will
be held out of the scope of the president's authority-not

58

Sacks v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 340 Ill. App. 76, 91 N.E.2d 127

(1950).

59 Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
913 (1959); Kline v. Thompson, 206 Wis. 464, 240 N.W. 128 (1932).
60 Pettit v. Doeskin Prods., Inc., 270 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 910 (1960) (applying N.Y. law); Kelly, Murray, Inc. v. Lansdowne Bank & Trust Co., 299 Pa. 236, 149 Ati. 190 (1930).
61Abraham Lincoln Life Ins. Co. v. Hopwood, 81 F.2d 284 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 687 (1936). For additional cases of contracts held
not in the ordinary course of business, see 2 FLETcHFR, CYCLOPrDA OF
PRivATz Colu'ozrbAo~s § 592 (rev. ed. 1954).
62 Jaffee v. Chicago Warehouse Lumber Co., 4 Ill. App. 2d 415, 421,
124 N.E.2d 618, 621 _(1954) ; accord, Renault v. L. N. Renault & Sons, 188
F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1951).
63 Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 357, 366 (2d Cir. 1959) (dictum).
64Cf. Halbert v. Berlinger, 127 Cal. App. 2d 6, 273 P.2d 274 (1954)
(flying own airplane on pleasure jaunt with prospective client); ItaloPetroleum Corp. of America v. Hannigan, 40 Del. (1 Terry) 534, 14 A.2d
401 (1940) (issuing a promissory note) ; Pegram-West, Inc. v. Winston Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 231 N.C. 277, 56 S.E.2d 607 (1949) (making oral guarantee
of construction contract).
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unlike the widening of the scope of employment rule in
present tort liability.
The other feature of the broad rule to be considered
is its presumptive or prima facie character.
Previous
writers have quite accurately observed that if the presumption of authority is made irrebuttable, it would then
represent a truly inherent, indefeasible power.6 5 But decisions which present the authority of the president in
such terms are quite rare. One such decision is Moore v.
Phillips"6 a 1959 California appellate case, which is a valid
instance of inherent authority in the Restatement sense.
The suit in question was to recover commissions for financing
real estate construction on land owned by four corporations. The circumstances were rather involved, but the
president of all four corporations was held to have acted
as agent for them as undisclosed principals. This eliminated
apparent authority, and the language of the court readily
transcended implied authority. The opinion declared that
the president, as executive officer, was "more than an
agent," and could in effect speak and act as the corporation
in furthering its objectives."
To these may perhaps be
added a 1934 Eighth Circuit opinion holding that a
president acting as agent for his corporation as undisclosed principal could bind it by any act which the board
of directors could authorize," and a 1959 Louisiana decision holding that the presumptive power of the president
overrode a rather clear charter provision stripping him of
authority to deal in corporate realty.6 9 But this rather
scant body of case law is all that the author is willing
to venture as even possible illustrations of an inherent authority in the Restatement usage.
6

5 Kempin, The Corporate Officer and the Law of Agency, 44 VA. L.

Rnv. 1273, 1278 (1958)

(citing no illustrative cases); Note, 61

HARv.

L.

REv. 867, 870 (1948), citing only St. Clair v. Rutledge, 115 Wis. 583, 92
N.W. 234 (1902), which is probably more accurately described as a result
produced by apparent authority.
66 176 Cal. App. 2d 702, ?09-10, 1 Cal. Rep. 508, 512 (1959).
67

Ibid.

Adams v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 73 F.2d 975, 979 (8th Cir. 1934).
Friedman v. Noel Estate, Inc., 236 La. 862, 109 So. 2d 447 (1959).
Factual circumstances may make this case explainable in terms of implied
customary authority, however.
68
69
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But quaere, does this mean that the ex officio presumption of authority in the president is only an extended
implied or apparent authority? Consider the language of
a recent Georgia opinion, Chal'erus v. Wilson Mfg. Co.:
"One acting in the capacity of president or general manager
of a corporation is presumed to be its alter ego. He is
its chief executive officer and agent, and, without any
special delegation of authority, is presumed to have power
to act for it in matters within the scope of its ordinary
business." 70 Is this sort of imputation of power accurately
described as implied authority?
In effect what the modern courts are doing is to read
into the office of the president a broad capacity to act
for the corporation, perhaps as broad as the corporate
charter itself, and certainly as broad as the normal corporate
economy. It would seem that whenever a corporation today
names its president, even if it narrowly restricts his express
powers to those of a figurehead, willy-nilly it has also
granted him implied powers measured by what is trade
usage for similar corporations. Granted that the presumption is rebuttable, how easy in a given case is it for the
corporation to rebut an inference based on popular conceptions of the office of the president? "x

All of this is said not by way of criticism of the
practical consequences of the ex officio powers doctrineto the contrary, it would seem a highly justifiable accommodation of the law to the normal expectations of the
community in corporate transactions as well as giving the
average president a convenient ease of operations in his
office. But it is intended to raise this question: If authority
deemed to reside in a person by virtue of his position is
so expansive as to cover nearly any act reasonably related
to the corporation, and is protected by a presumption implied
in law rather than in fact, would it not be more accurate
to term such authority inherent rather than implied? Is

70212 Ga. 612, 613, 94 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1956).
71Kempin, szpra note 65, at 1282-83; cf. Notes, 57 CoLUM. L.
868, 885 (1957); 50 YALE L.J. 348, 349, 353 (1940).

REv.

1962]

CORPORATE LITIGATION

it not possible that here is a form of inherent authority
not directly provided for in the Restatement?
Summary
The lawyer as a pragmatist will want to know what
is the effective range of the powers of the president. If
the president is also general manager, this range approximates that of the corporate structure itself, though the
limitation against glaringly extraordinary acts and contracts does remain. The president in a state treating him
as any other director is restricted to those powers spelled
out, but to protect innocent third parties a gradually widening range of customary authority can be proved. Moreover the trend in the last quarter century appears decisively
toward the broader rule. This ex officio authority of the
president within the ordinary conduct of business is surrounded by a dike against unusual contracts, but this dike
has shown signs of leakage. It is probable that the
president in these jurisdictions can obligate the corporation
by any contract which a jury can find to be reasonably
related to the corporate economy, judged by contemporary
corporate practices. It is likely that the presumption of
authority involved will grow increasingly harder to rebut.
In terms of doctrinal development, any ex officio powers
of the president and those of the president-general manager
represent at the very least an extremely broad implied
authority. In the author's opinion, under this facade of
imputed customary authority there lurks a true species of
inherent authority by no means totally identifiable with
that recognized in the Restatement. Future developments
may permit us to discern its contours more exactly. Thus
far the stress in its rationale has been laid on the expectations of the public. The second portion of this article,
on the power of the president to conduct litigation, may
show that the rationale for this variety of inherent authority
derives equally as much from a desire to promote the
corporation's interests as such.
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In the myriad cases involving the authority of the
president to create general corporate obligations, it was
necessary to speak with caution. In the more limited
area of case law involving the authority of the president
over corporate litigation, it is possible to draw more definite
conclusions. Tbere are perhaps only one hundred decisions
in point, and a careful culling of their contents demonstrates
that the president prima facie does have authority to
engage counsel to institute, defend, conduct or settle litigation, or simply to provide legal services. Further, though
most cases provide a factual basis for a finding of implied
authority, there is substantial support for deeming his power
in this regard an inherent one.
Historically, the first distinct imputation of the power
to conduct corporate litigation was made in favor of bank
presidents and managing cashiers. 2 The motive force for
such imputation is quite obvious: it was absurd to require
the president of a bank to document his authority with
an enabling resolution every time he wished to foreclose
a mortgage, engage in a construction of a trust instrument,
or sue on a promissory note. To facilitate bank management, courts were quite willing to find grounds for implying
authority in the president or cashier. From implying
authority in fact to implying authority as a matter of law
was an easy step early taken. By the start of this century,
the dictum that the president of a bank ex virtute officii
could institute litigation was universal."
Movement from the idea that it was advantageous to
grant bank presidents this power to the idea that it was
72 Savings Bank v. Benton, 59 Ky. (2 Metcalfe) 240 (185R)
(president);
Eastman v. Coos Bank, 1 N.H. 23 (1817) (cashier) ; National Bank v. Earl,
2 Okla. 617, 39 Pac. 391 (1895) (president); cf. Western Bank v. Gilstrap,
45 7Mo.
419 (1870) (cashier).
3
E.g., Yatesville Banking Co. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 17 Ga. App. 420,
87 S.E. 606 (1916)
(memorandum decision); Merchants' Nat'l Bank v.
Eustis, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 350, 28 S.W. 227 (1894); First Nat'l Bank v.
Kimberlands, 16 W. Va. 555, 579 (1880) (dictum).
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equally advantageous to grant all corporate presidents the
same power- especially if the corporation was litigation
prone- involved no drastic mental leap. As early as 1842
a New York court was asserting: "It is a matter of every
day's occurrence for the presidents or other head officers
of corporations to employ and retain attorneys and counsel
to prosecute and defend suits, or to assist in legal proceedings in which the corporation is interested." " In the
succeeding century, whenever the authority of the president
over corporate litigation has been judicially called in question, it has usually been upheld as a matter of course.
By way of statistical summary, sixteen jurisdictions, led
by Illinois, New Jersey and New York, have recognized such
presidential power, and federal courts in three states lacking
a binding state precedent have declared for it." 5 Utah
and Wisconsin have thus far upheld such authority only
in situations involving some emergency, five other jurisdictions have endorsed the exercise of this power by a
bank president, and a final eight have only had occasion
to sanction the exercise of litigious authority by presidents
Only three stateswho were also general managers."
Iowa, California and Massachusetts-have categorically refused to impute power over litigation to the president as
such, and the latter two have proved willing to grant it
Professor Lattin has
to a president-general manager. 7
74
American Ins. Co. v. Oakley, 4 N.Y. Ch. (9 Paige 496, 501) 789, 792
(1842).
75
For case citations, see the Appendix under the appropriate state name.
The sixteen jurisdictions are Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and the federal common
law prior to 1935. Federal courts in Alabama, Maryland and Virginia are
in accord. Connecticut's recent decision, Zaubler v. West View Hills, Inc.,
148 Conn. 540, 172 A2d 604 (1961), certainly suggests the same rule would
obtain
76 there in an appropriate case.
See the Appendix under the appropriate state name. Georgia and
Oklahoma support the authority both of bank presidents and presidentgeneral managers. Arkansas, South Dakota and District of Columbia have
only had cases involving bank presidents, and California, Massachusetts,
Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon and Rhode Island have thus far only
sanctioned the power of the president-general manager.
77See the Appendix under the appropriate state name. In addition, Dent
v. Peoples Bank, 118 Ark. 157, 175 S.W. 1154 (1915), held that while a
bank president did have power to hire counsel to conduct specific suits, he
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stated that the law is moving toward a rule recognizing
presidential power to appoint counsel as an incident to
authority to manage the corporation."8 It would be more
accurate to assert that the law has already arrived at such
a rule.
Although on the periphery of the subject, the power
of officers other than the president to conduct litigation
is not without practical significance and should be briefly
noted. As observed above, the cashier or treasurer of a
bank was early granted this power as a matter of convenience, especially to insure prompt collection of debts.7"
Not surprisingly, since many states place the emphasis on
the existence of a managerial status in the president, the
power of any official having substantial managerial qualities
is generally considered to extend to control over law suits."
Again, a vice-president or other officer acting in lieu of
the president clearly will succeed to the latter's prerogatives."'
But, a secretary, treasurer or other lower
official as such cannot claim to exert such power over litigation normally, since it is patently far afield from his regular
duties; however, even here circumstances may warrant a
finding of implied authority or ratification.82 Finally, even
could not engage a long-term general counsel-a rather restrictive view
compared with most states. Taylor v. Friedman Co., 152 Ga. 529, 110
S.E. 679 (1922), is the only other decision denying presidential authority
worthy of note. In an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the court held
that while a president might have power to engage counsel generally, he did
not have authority to bind his corporation to accept jurisdiction in a foreign
forum and defend there. Since Georgia has been perfectly willing to
permit the president-general manager of a foreign corporation to bind his
firm by hiring local counsel in a suit in Georgia, Dublin & S.W. Ry. v.
Akerman & Akerman, 2 Ga. App. 746, 59 S.E. 10 (1907), the Taylor
opinion can only be characterized as an excess of chauvinism.
78
LAIrIN, CORPORATIONS 231 (1959).
79 Bangor Say. Bank v. Wallace, 87 Me. 28, 32 At]. 716 (1894); Bristol
County Sav. Bank v. Keavy, 128 Mass. 298 (1880).
SONew Mexico Potash & Chem. Co. v. Oliver, 123 Colo. 268, 228 P2d
979 (1951) (auditing committee); Southgate v. Atlantic & Pac. R.R., 61
Mo. 89 (1875) (railroad superintendent) ; McKevitt v. Golden Age Breweries, Inc., 14 Wash. 2d 50, 126 P.Zd 1077 (1942) (secretary-treasurergeneral counsel) (alternative holding).
81 Russell v. Washington Sav. Bank, 23 App. D.C. 398 (1904); cf.
Fernald v. Spokane & B.C. Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 Wash. 672, 72 Pac. 462
(per curiam).
(1903)
82 Sealand Inv. Corp. v. Emprise, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 305, 12 Cal. Rep.
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on strict agency principles it is perfectly permissible to
allow lower officers to sue or defend on behalf of the corporation in some emergency, as when a receivership is
threatened, or corporate assets may be depleted, or the
internal organization of the corporation has erupted in
factional disorder."3
Returning to main stream, the juridical underpinning

of the rule that a president prima facie has power over
corporate law suits must now be examined. Many decisions
quite naturally simply declare for the president's authority without more, leaving no room for any analysis. Fortunately most courts are more helpful. The largest number
look to implied agency, based on construction from an
express grant,8 4 from a past custom,88 or from ratification
in virtue of a knowing acquiescence of the board of
directors. 6
The readiness with which a jurisdiction will imply
authority is proportionate to some degree to their adherence
to the narrow or broad view of presidential authority over
contracts noted in the first section of this article. The
leading Iowa decision, ATey v. Eastern Iowa Tel. Go.,"3

153 (1961); Scott v. New York Filling Co., 79 N.J.L. 231, 75 At. 772
(Sup. Ct. 1910) (dictum); see Kelly v. Ning Yung Benevolent Ass'n, 2 Cal.
App. 460, 84 Pac. 321 (1905) (ratification found).
83Hillcrest Paper Co. v. Ohlstein, 10 Misc. 2d 286, 172 N.Y.S.2d 827
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd nin., 6 App. Div. 2d 864, 175 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1st Dep't
1958) (suit to preserve corporate assets); Golden State Glass Corp. v.
Superior Court, 13 Cal. 2d 384, 90 P.2d 75 (1939) (defense against receivership); Central Shorwood Bldg. Corp. v. Saltzstein, 245 Wis. 138, 13
N.W.2d 525 (1944) (suit arising out of intra-corporate factionalism).
84Argue v. Monte Regio Corp., 115 Cal. App. 575, 2 P.2d 54 (1931).
See also Andrews, Andrews & McBride v. Two-in-One Gold Mines Ltd.,
[1937] Ont. 482, [1937] 2 D.L.R. 709 (Ct. App.) (alternative holding).
85Potter v. New York Infant Asylum, 44 Hun. 367 (Sup. Ct. 1887),
aff'd mere., 118 N.Y. 684, 23 N.E. 1147 (1890)
(alternative holding);
Traxler v. Minneapolis Cedar & Lumber Co., 128 Minn. 295, 150 N.W.
914 (1915).
86 Pixley v. Western Pac. R.R., 33 Cal. 183 (1867)
(ratification of
oral contract even though by-laws required all contracts to be in writing
and by the board of directors); Warren v. Boston Nat'l Bank, 252 Mass.
523, 147 N.E. 887 (1925); Twohy v. Slate Creek Mining Co., 31 Wash.
2d 668, 198 P.2d 832 (1948) (alternative holding).
87 162 Iowa 525, 144 N.W. 383 (1913).
Similarly adhering to the view
that the president as such has no more authority than any other director are
Pacific Bank v. Stone, 121 Cal. 202, 53 Pac. 634 (1898); Kelly v. Citizens
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for example, specifically adhered to the Iowa doctrine that
a president has no authority but that expressly derived from
the basic corporate organs. An attorney was therefore
held unable to recover for services rendered a corporation
whose president (not a general manager) engaged him to
sue the largest stockholder for an accounting. This narrow
agency formulation seems rather limited for modern corporate operations, and only succeeded in working practical
hardship on an attorney acting in reasonable reliance on
the president's putative powers.
A. good contrast is
Twyeffort v. Unexcelled Mfg. Co.,SS which followed the broad
rule in permitting a general counsel to recover for somewhat unusual services. The New York Court of Appeals
quite sensibly noted that what was unusual work for a
corporate counsel need not be an extraordinary contract
for the president to make, taking the broader perspective
of his extensive managerial functions-a healthy policy
attitude in the modern corporate world.
Events may expand implied authority. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court illustrated this in allowing recovery
of attorneys' fees for services rendered lower corporate
officers in defending a suit brought against them by the
president (who eventually won) in a serious factional dispute. The reasoning is impeccable implied agency theory:
[I]f by reason of an emergency or by necessity it becomes impossible for an agent to protect his principal's property or interests
by a strict compliance with his usual or regular authority, the
scope of his authority is extended or varied to fit the circumstances.
The officer or agent who then acts in good faith and with reason-

Fin. Co., 306 Mass. 531, 28 N.E.2d 1005 (1940).
Cf. Standard Constr.
Co. v. Crabb, [1914] 7 West. Weekly R. 719, 7 Sask. 365.
88263 N.Y. 6, 188 N.E. 138 (1933). In substantial accord are Lewis v.
Pulitzer Publishing Co., 77 Mo. App. 434 (1898) (hiring of a general
counsel for a newspaper not unusual because of frequent libel actions);
Smith v. McKee, 55 S.D. 572, 226 N.W. 766 (1929) (quiet title action
within the ordinary course of business of bank president) ; Hackney v. York,
18 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (president authorized "to
employ an attorney to render services necessary to the proper management
of the business").
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able discretion . .. is still held to be acting for his principal with
authority to bind him by his acts. 89

This lucid rationale provides the basis for a critique of an
older California precedent, Pacific Bank v. Stone.90 There
the president resigned and the board of directors was
ousted by a court order granting an application for a
receivership by creditors. The vice-president then hired
an attorney who successfully defended the rights of the
management in the subsequent proceedings. The chaos in
the corporation could not have been more pronounced, yet
when the attorney sued for his fee, the court denied recovery.
Arguing with remarkable insensitivity to the prudent reaction of the vice-president, the opinion declared that even
in an emergency an officer who is not also general manager
must resort to the board of directors for authorization before
hiring counsel. This unrealistic precedent was weakened
by a 1939 California decision." When the president brought
a personal action for a receivership, the vice-president
and secretary, who were two of the four directors, were
permitted to defend in the corporate name-even though
the president's suit alleged personal malfeasance on their
part. The result is proper because in fact they were the
operational managerial authority in the corporation.
Turning from implied to other types of authority,
it is time for a little refining categorization. There have
been essentially only three factual circumstances in which
the president's authority over litigation has been in issue:
1) an exception to the president's right to begin or defend
suit by the adverse party; 2) a challenge by the corporation
itself, usually in an attempt to set aside an unsatisfactory
judgment; and 3) a suit by the attorneys for the value
89 De Pasquale v. Societa De M. S. Maria, 54 R.I. 399, 401, 173 AtI.
623, 624 (1934).
90 121 Cal. 202, 53 Pac. 634 (1898).
91 Golden State Glass Corp. v. Superior Court, supra note 83. The
recent decision, Sealand Inv. Corp. v. Emprise Inc., supra note 82, ruled
that a corporate officer with 50% stock control could not sue in the
corporate name the president and other 50% ownership. The court found
no emergency warranting suit, and an absence of managerial authority in
the officer.
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of their services.9 2 Only in the third situation is there
any possibility of third party interests being involved, which
interests constitute the basis both for apparent authority
and the Restatement's variety of inherent authority.
When a president who lacks implied authority hires
an attorney, binding apparent authority can rise from
only two sources: a) direct manifestations by the corporation,
as in a misleading resolution of the board of directors, or
b) indirect manifestations via the president himself, in
the form of similar conduct which is authorized. But direct
manifestations of a deceptive character are by the nature
of the case extremely rare, and since the conduct of litigation
is a rather sid generis affair, indirect manifestations are
hard to conceive of. Courts nonetheless do speak of apparent authority operating in behalf of the attorney, but
the manifestations relied upon are only the normal activities
of the president as a manager. This is not terribly persuasive of a genuine apparent authority. The opinions
tend to observe rather caustically that "it would be an
unusual occurrence for members of the bar to take the
precaution to inquire . . . whether or not a certain agent
or representative who employs them has been authorized
to do so by a formal resolution of the board of directors ....,,
1
This in effect negates any duty of the attorney to inquire
into the president or managing officer's powers at all.
With no attempt to find any overt manifestation by
the board or in past similar conduct, but simply an imputation of authority in virtue of the holding of the office
of president or general manager, the true rationale would
92 A
fourth rather rare fact pattern occurs when the corporation is
sued in tort, usually for malicious prosecution, arising out of the original
suit, and the corporation seeks to deny the authority of its president or
managing officer. See Frost v. Domestic Sewing Mach. Co., 133 Mass. 563
(1882) (general manager had prima facie power to sue in replevin);
Ricord v. Central Pac. R.R., 15 Nev. 167 (1880) (president and superintendent had prima facie authority to bring criminal charges for larceny);
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Shouldis, 253 S.W. 935 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923) (authority of general manager to bring criminal charge of theft is
an issue of fact).
93 Becker v. National Ref. Co., 50 S.W.2d 670. 673 (Mo. Ct. Apn. 1932):
accord. American Ins. Co. v. Oakley, 4 N.Y. Ch. (9 Paige 496, 501) 789,

791 (1842).
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appear not to be apparent authority, but rather inherent
authority in the Restatenent sense-a binding of a principal
by his general agent in order to protect a third party.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Field,94 a Nebraska case in which
a district manager of an insurance company was held
to obligate his corporation by hiring an attorney, deceived
only by his managerial status, although the corporation
reserved all engaging of attorneys to its home office, certainly fits the bill of inherent agency. Other cases, lacking
this aspect of express violation of orders by the agent,
nevertheless would seem more representative of inherent
than apparent authority.95
Leaving the area of suits by attorneys, and turning
to challenges by the adverse party or the corporation itself,
the absence of any third party interest would make it
seem prima facie that only implied or a novel type of inherent authority could be involved. This is probably too
facile a generalization. Especially where the challenge is
in the form of an unsupported demurrer or exception by
the adverse litigant, the operative rationale would appear
to be more in the nature of a presumption of regularity
than any aspect of agency. The idea is that a stranger
ought not to be able to contest the authority of the president
during the course of the litigation itself, or at least should
be confronted with a fairly stiff presumption of valid authorization. 6 Louisiana is the only jurisdiction that ever really
had trouble in this respect. An unusually shortsighted
doctrine developed there that permitted exceptions by the
adverse litigant even in so extreme a case as Jeanerett,
Rice d Milling Co. v. Durocher.7 In that decision, the
president of a corporation in process of liquidation who
sued to collect debts, with the express consent of a majority
94

2 Neb. 442, 89 N.W. 249 (1902).

95 General Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Guaranty Mortgage & Sec. Corp.,
264 Mass. 253, 162 N.E. 319 (1928); Becker v. National Ref. Co., 50
S.W.2d 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
96Mardel Sec., Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 183 F.
Supp. 7
(E.D. Va. 1960); Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Henry, 21 Haw. 62 (1912); Hillcrest
Paper Co. v. Ohlstein, 10 Misc. 2d 286, 172 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd inen. 6 App. Div. 2d 864, 175 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1st Dep't 1958).
97 123 La. 160, 48 So. 780 (1909).
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of the individual directors, was prevented from recovering
by one of the defendant debtors solely for want of a formal
board resolution! The upshot in Louisiana was a statute
which specifically accords to the president, vice-president
or manager of every corporation the power to sue.98 This
is only common sense. There seems no good cause to permit
an adverse litigant (unless he be also involved in the
corporate managerial structure, as a director or officer)
to raise any technical objection to the authorization of the
suit. Any abuse can be more properly resolved within
the corporate structure itself.
It remains to consider a type of inherent authority
which doesn't fit the Restatemnent usage because there is
no third party whose interests are decisive. 9 There is
good ground for believing that such a new species of inherent
authority exists. For one thing, courts so often use language
stressing inherent or ex officio powers. Even though it is
advisable to be more concerned with what a judge does
than what he says, a knowledgeable presentation by a judge
does have a strong flavor of credibility about it. Thus,
one court proclaims the existence of "inherent powers
of presidents of corporations, that is, the powers not
derived from the express action of the board of directors
or those to be deduced from the continued exercise by the
president with the silent acquiescence of the board of
directors," " i. e., powers in no wise implied. As this
rule is stated in a decision (discussed in the next section)
which requires the rationale of inherent agency for intelligible explanation, it should carry substantial weight.
98 LA. REv. STAT. 12:35 (1950), enacted in 1914. Surprisingly inobservant
counsel and court have caused the old rule to be followed, ignoring the
statute, as late as 19471 Community Chest v. Union Mission Ass'n, 30
So. 2d 131 (La. Ct. App. 1947).
99 Generally, such a suit represents a challenge by other elements within
the corporation of the presidential authority. Cases where the attorney sues
for services rendered, but the court is concerned only with the powers of
the president and not with any reliance on the part of the attorney
(apparent authority), are also included.
100 Colman v. West Virginia Oil & Oil Land Co., 25 W. Va. 148, 168-69
(1884); accord, Winfield Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Robinson, 89 Kan. 842,
132 Pac. 979 (1913); Beebe v. George H. Beebe Co., 64 N.J.L. 497, 46
Atl. 168 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
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A review of the breadth of the incidents of this presidential
authority in specific cases provides further pragmatic evidence that a novel species of inherent authority exists in
corporate law.
First, this power has been held to exist in the president
unless it is removed by "a positive or express direction not
to employ counsel, or . . . a general direction . . . to take
no steps to defend any action." 10' So held the federal
court in Blue Goose Mining Co. v. Northern Light Mining
Co.
in refusing to set aside a judgment against a corporation whose president lacked express authority to appear
and defend. To denominate as "implied" a power which
exists in the president ab initio and must be expressly
removed by the board, is to stretch this agency concept
beyond recognition. The power must be inherent. To drive
the point home, consider this further language:
Of course, the "general charge" of the business vested in the president was subject to the control of the board of directors. But,
unless the directors otherwise provided or took some action in the
matter, there was no subtraction from the power of the president,
with managing authority,
to employ counsel to defend the suit
10 3
against the corporation.
Second, even though the firm has a general counsel,
or one is provided by the board, the president has been
held to be able to hire additional counsel and to determine
the course of the litigation himself-absent express denial
by the board. Thus an often-cited Kansas decision reversed
a trial court for refusing to permit the attorneys hired
by the president from defending alone on behalf of the
corporation in a liquidation action, and instead recognized
the attorneys formerly hired by the board. Said the Kansas
Supreme Court: "The mere fact that the board of directors
101 Blue Goose Mining Co. v. Northern Light Mining Co.,
727, 730 (9th Cir. 1917); accord, Winfield Mortgage & Trust Co.
son, supra note 100, at 847, 132 Pac. at 980; Dallas Ice-Factory
Storage Co. v. Crawford, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 176, -,
44 S.W.

245 Fed.
v. Robin& Cold875, 878

(1898); Colman v. West Virginia Oil & Oil Land Co., supra note 100, at
169.
102245 Fed. 727 (9th Cir. 1917).
0 3
1
Id. at 731.
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had employed counsel would not necessarily take away from
the president the right to control a case in court, and
to have the bank represented by other counsel, if he saw
fit." 104 According such far-reaching independent operational
status to the president is a good sign that the court regards
his authority as indigenous, and not derivative.
The third feature to be observed is the policy motivation
for according this sort of authority. In normal circumstances, it lies in the promotion of speedy, convenient and
easy handling of corporate affairs; 5 in abnormal situations,
in the facilitation of immediate and resolute action. 00
Consider the following state of affairs. In a close corporation the treasurer and usual manager of affairs has
been guilty of improper withdrawal of corporate funds.
The president, previously largely inactive, wishes to sue
the treasurer. Must he await formal authorization? No,
said the Wisconsin Supreme Court in G-een Bay Fish Co.
v. Jorgensen: "It would be an idle formality to insist
that the board of directors should be convened to do by
formal resolution that which would be and ought to be
so evidently -within the power of the head of such a corporation." 107 And other courts have agreed. 08 The corporate interest is better served in pressing circumstances
by declaring without exception that the power to hire counsel
inheres in the office of the president, rather than by searching
out or awaiting technical implied authorization.
104 Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Berry, 53 Kan. 696, 698, 37 Pac. 131 (1894);
accord, Davis v. Memphis City Ry., 22 Fed. 883 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1885)
(president may hire additional counsel to defend against a shareholders'
derivative suit) ; Bounds v. Stephenson, 187 S.W. 1031 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916)
(president may hire counsel in addition to general counsel).
105 Western Bank v. Gilstrap, 45 Mo. 419 (1870) (promptness in collection of debts); Reno Water Co. v. Leete, 17 Nev. 203, 30 Pac. 702 (1882)
(prompt suit often desirable and delay for board vote unnecessary). Note
especially Root v. Olcott, 42 Hun. 536, 539 (N.Y. 1st Dep't 1886) (bank
cashier): "[S]uch a power [to sue] should not only be regarded as incidental, but indispensable .... "
o106See Regal Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Merlis, 274 Fed. 915 (2d Cir.
1921); Elblum Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 120 N.J.L. 604, 1 A.2d 204 (Sup.
Ct. 1938); Kamas Sec. Co. v. Taylor, 119 Utah 241. 226 P.2d 111 (1950).
107 165 Wis. 548, 553-54, 163 N.W. 142, 144 (1917).
108 See cases collected in note 106 supra.
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Fourth and finally, the true protection of the corporation from abuse of this portentous power of the president
lies in internal corporate remedies, or an action for damages
from him, rather than in any judicial untying of the bonds
he has (often in perfectly good faith) knotted. This proposition has been recognized consistently from the earliest
decisions to the present, whether the fact pattern involved
a suit for attorneys' fees,'0 9 an exception to authority by
an adverse litigant,"10 or a subsequent challenge by or within
the corporation itself."' The corporation is obligated "even
though the circumstances qhoWV that the president acted
so improperly in employing the counsel that he might
properly be held responsible for his breach of trust"; 112
its relief lies in subsequent indemnification from the president, or in speedy "removal of the indiscreet officer.""'
This rule is strong evidence that it is an inherent authority
with which we are concerned, for otherwise the corporation
could be exculpated on the simple ground that the president
exceeded his implied powers.
On the basis of the above consideration of incidents
of the inherent power to litigate, it may be concluded that
(except in some instances of suits by attorneys, where there
is an overlapping) this authority is not the same as that
inherent power of the general agent recognized by the Restatenzent. In Professor Seavey's concept of the inherent
agency power, the principal is obligated by the unauthorized
act of the agent for the protection of a third party. In
this corporate form of inherent agency, the president as
agent has the power to act on behalf of and to bind the
corporation, his ultimate principal, without authority from
the board, his immediate principal, in order to further the
109

Potter v. New York Infant Asylum, 44 Hun. 367 (Sup. Ct. 1887),

aff'd men., 118 N.Y. 684, 23 N.E. 1147 (1890); Campbell v. Pittsburg
Bridge
Co., 23 Pa. Super. 138, 140-41 (1903).
" 0 American Ins. Co. v. Oakley, 4 N.Y. Ch. (9 Paige 496) 789 (1842).
l Davis v. Memphis City Ry., 22 Fed. 883 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1885):
Fernald v. Spokane & B.C. Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 Wash. 672, 72 Pac. 462
(1903) (per curiam).
112Fernald v. Spokane & B.C. Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 111, at 677,
72 Pac. at 463.
113 Potter v. New York Infant Asylum, supra note 109.
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well-being of the corporate principal. No third party
intrudes into the picture at all. The underlying policy
motivation is that it is expedient to enable some person,
normally the president but sometimes another managing
officer, to take expeditious and decisive action in litigation
on behalf of the corporation. Judgments on the worth of
this concept, and the practical extent of its sweep, are
possible only after we complete this study by analysis of
those decisions in which the president's authority is questioned in virtue of internal corporate division or deadlock.
III

Tni

EFFECT OF DEADLOCK OR DIVISION

What happens when a corporation has a valid cause
of action but the board of directors is equally divided
on the wisdom of suit? May the president act, or is
paralysis inevitable? Does it make any difference if the
tie vote occurs when the corporation is being sued, rather
than when it is the plaintiff? Must the president have
recourse to the board even if he has reason to believe that
the net effect will be a tie vote on the advisability of
litigation or that the effect will be a vote against suit?
Does jeopardy of a substantial corporate interest alter the
answer to any of the questions above?
These are the fascinating questions which form the core
of any consideration of the authority of the president over
corporate litigation, and which plumb the depths of the
theories of agency as applied to corporations. Their practical
significance is demonstrated by the relative frequency with
which they have cropped up in our courtrooms in recent
years. New York alone has had eighteen cases in point
since 1935, and for circumstances which are admittedly
somewhat unusual, this is a considerable number. Nor
is an end necessarily in sight. The breeding ground for
problems of deadlock is the multiplication in recent years
of the close corporation composed of evenly balanced shareholding groups, usually families or other corporations. 4
1142 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS:

LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.06 (1958).
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This device is especially popular for corporate entities,
precluded from entering into partnerships, which nonetheless
wish to pool interests in a specific joint venture while retaining the highest measure of control. In such close
corporations equal pairings of directors parallel equal allocations of shares and equal capital contributions. Most
such corporations flourish or languish without arousing
any legal problem. But the device is deadlock-prone, and
when the harmony ends, the lawyer's headaches begin.
The circumstance of deadlock over the decision to
engage in litigation is, in terms of likelihood, aberrant.
Yet, as is not unusual in the law, it is precisely this
situation that proves the most fertile soil for doctrinal
growth. The more intricate the problem, the more delicate
the solution, and the more sophisticated the legal principles
derived therefrom. With particular reference to the authority of the corporate president over litigation, these deadlock and division cases prune away any issue of interests
other than those of the corporation itself. Formulations
of agency theory are restricted to implied authority or
some variant of inherent authority. Issues of policy are
necessarily framed entirely in terms of the welfare of the
corporation itself. Within these contours, with each additional case the pattern of doctrinal development is becoming clearer, and the signs point to inherent authority
as the juridical instrument for promoting the corporate
interests in situations of division or deadlock over litigation.
Analytically speaking, there are five possible ways in
which the doubt as to presidential authority can arise:
1) a division among the officers or directors, but no deadlock in the board; 2) an actual deadlock in the board;
3) no board vote, but the president has reason to believe
a board vote would result in a tie; 4) no board vote,
but the president knows any vote would be antagonistic
to suit; 5) an actual majority vote on the board in opposition to suit. Each of these possibilities will be considered in turn, but first it may be prudent to state briefly
the holdings of the major decisions in the area. This
will enable free cross-reference among them and provide an
initial outline of the case law-especially desirable in the
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rather confusing condition of New York law, where a road
map is essential.
One of the strongest decisions, upholding the president's
power to sue even after an express adverse declaration by
the board, is also one of the earliest, Recamier Mfg. Co. v.
Seymour." 5 Another early opinion, Colman v. West Virginia
Oil , Oil Land Co., n s is notable for its clear presentation of
inherent authority in allowing the acting president to
conduct litigation despite an allegation that the majority
of the individual directors were opposed to his action. In
1921 came the federal court decision in Regal Cleaners &
Dyers, Inc. v. Merlis,"7 which held the president could
defend against a receivership action brought by two of the
four directors. Similar leading precedents were Elblum
Holding Corp. v. Mintz,"18 permitting the president to sue
affirmatively for a major corporate debt despite a tacit
19
deadlock, and Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove,'
which extended this power in favor of a president-general
manager to sue even in an actual deadlock. The law seemed
headed toward a rule giving the president the right to sue
despite actual or tacit deadlock among the directors, and
the early New York cases were no exception. 20
Then came the celebrated decision of Sterling Industries,
Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 2 ' in which the New York
Court of Appeals made a calculated return to the more
usual principles of agency, and denied the president the
right to sue following an actual tie in the board of directors.
Sterling had its progeny,1 22 but soon the full extent of its

115 15 Daly 245 (N.Y.C.P. 1889).
116 25 W. Va. 148 (1884).
117274 Fed. 915 (2d Cir. 1921).
118 120 N.J.L. 604, 1 A.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
119298 Mass. 53, 9 N.E.2d 573 (1937).
120 Best-Site Associates v. Ventrice, 245 App. Div. 758, 280 N.Y. Supp.
583 (2d Dep't 1935) (per curiam); Warwick Sportswear Co. v. Simons,
4 Misc. 2d 482, 13 N.Y.S2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (per curiam); see Matter
of Bernheimer, 4 Misc. 2d 503, 43 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inee.,
266 App. Div. 868, 43 N.Y.S2d 277 (2d Dep't 1943).
Contra, Legion
Against Vivisection v. Grey, 63 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
121298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d 790 (1949).
122 Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 532
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grozods, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953);
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rule began to be whittled away. Rothman & Schneider, Inc.
v. Beckerman 2 3 declared that a general manager could sue
in a tacit deadlock if the suit was against a technical
outsider, rather than against a component member of the
corporation, and Paloma Frocks, Inc. v. Shamolin Sportswear Corp.124 decided that the president could sue even against
inside interests to enforce a prior arbitration clause, on
the theory that the original contractual consent to arbitration could not be vitiated by less than a majority of
the board. The stage was thus set for the most recent
stellar attraction, West View Hills, Inc. v. IAzau Realty
Corp. 25 In this holding, the Court of Appeals has sanctioned
the power of the corporate president to sue even though
he must know that a majority of the directors would be
opposed, inasmuch as the majority in essence 'Were also the
defendants. A connected Connecticut case, Zaubler v. West
View Hills, Tnc.,1 2 5 a allowed the continuance of the suit, even
after the board of directors met and voted to order its
withdrawal. This last rule can have no rationale other
than inherent authority, and marks the modern high water
mark of that doctrine. But it is now time to turn to an
analysis of each of the possible problem areas.
Division Among the Officers
This category of cases need not long detain us, since
the operative principle is rather clear. The functional
center of authority within the corporation should control,
regardless of the wishes of the other officers, absent any
directives from the board. Ordinarily this will be the
president,126 who may sue on behalf of the corporation, and
need not resort to a shareholder's derivative action even
if there is substantial opposition by individual directors or
Tidy-House Paper Corp. v. Adlman, 4 App. Div. 2d 619, 168 N.Y.S.2d
448 (1st Dep't 1957); Kardwheel Corp. v. Karper, 1 Misc. 2d 707, 148

N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup. Ct. 1956).

1232 N.Y.2d 493, 141 N.E.2d 610, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1957).
1243 N.Y.2d 572, 147 N.E.2d 779, 170 N.Y.S2d 509 (1958).
1256 N.Y.2d 344, 160 N.E.2d 622, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1959).
125a 148 Conn. 540, 172 A.2d 604 (1961).
126 Best-Site Associates v. Ventrice, supra note 120; Green Bay Fish Co.
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officers,127 or if the suit coincides with his own interests as
shareholder. 2 '
The problem of where the ultimate authority should
lie occurred in a somewhat aggravated situation in Freenm
v. King Pontiac Co.,.29 a recent South Carolina decision.
The president, the largest shareholder, was largely inactive, and the constitution called for the vice-president
to be general manager. In fact the business was managed by one Moore. The vice-president sought to audit
the books, as he had previously, and when refused by
Moore, sued. The president in turn ordered the cessation
of suit. The court held that the president should rightfully
prevail, citing some rather general language giving him
supervisory authority, but laying greatest stress on the
fact that he was "for all practical purposes the owner of
the corporation. . .. ,,'

The decision seems justified on

the facts, but one wonders about the advisability of relating
the power to sue to majority shareholding interest. Suppose
the president were to sue the largest shareholder for some
reason. The Iowa court in the Ney case, discussed in the
previous section,' 3 ' held the president was then without
power to sue. Has the president no fiduciary duty to the
minority shareholders, or to the welfare of the corporation
as an entity separate from the welfare of the largest shareholders? This question assumes greater urgency when we
turn later to West View Hills.
Actual Deadlock in the Board
By all odds the most fascinating factual circumstances
of any of the division or deadlock cases exist in the three
v. Jorgensen, 165 Wis. 548, 163 N.W. 142 (1917). In Golden State Corp.
v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 2d 384, 90 P.2d 75 (1939), the secretary and
treasurer were allowed to act on behalf of the corporation against the
president because they held the real reins of authority in the corporation.
127Kamas Sec. Co. v. Taylor, 119 Utah 241, 226 P.2d 111 (1950).
128 Lycette v. Green River Gorge, Inc., 21 Wash. 2d 859, 153 P.2d 873
(1944).
129236 S.C. 335, 114 S.E.2d 478 (1960).
130 Id. at -, 114 S.E.2d at 484.

131 Ney v. Eastern Iowa Tel. Co., 162 Iowa 525, 144 N.W. 383 (1913),
discussed supra at note 87 and accompanying text.
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Lydia Pnkham decisions, 3 ' all bearing the same name,
and all reflecting an internecine feud of which the Hatfields
and McCoys could have been proud. The Lydia E. Pinkhiam
Medicine Co. was a concern composed of equal shareholding
interests, with a Pinkham as president and a Gove as treasurer. After some years of profitable sales of its medicinal
preparations, dissension arose in 1925 between the two
groups. Miss Lydia P. Gove, a strong-minded business
woman, who was assistant-treasurer (effectually treasurer,
since her eighty-year-old mother was largely inactive), felt
that she should have the right to dictate advertising policies,
in which field she had some rather drastic suggestions for
innovations. When president Arthur Pinkham demurred,
and continued to direct advertising his way, the feud was
on. Miss Gove wielded the full power of the purse as a
weapon, refusing to pay outstanding debts, allocate dividends,
or settle the advertising agency accounts, with the avowed
purpose of compelling the Pinkhams to sell out. Finally,
the president resorted to suit in the corporate name to
compel Miss Gove to fulfill the proper functions of the
treasurer's office.
The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the president's
power to sue by resorting to a double implication of authority. During a temporary truce in 1927, a board resolution
had given the president general supervision of the business
in the execution of the directives of the board. The court
declared it necessary to construe this resolution liberally
"to give the president charge of the business as a whole,
subject of course to the power of the directors to give specific
directions from time to time or to modify or recall the
grant." "' Since the deadlock was a lasting one, this was
tantamount to giving complete control of the corporation
to the president. Having implied this sweeping authority
of a general manager, Jludge Qua went on to imply from
132 Lydia E. Pinkhan Medicine Co. v. Gove, 298 Mass. 53, 9 N.E.2d 573
(1937); Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E.2d
482 (1939); Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 305 Mass. 213, 25
N.E.2d 332 (1940).
33 298 Mass. at 64, 9 N.E.2d at 579.
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it the specific power to institute even such an unusual suit
as this, not as an individual shareholder, but on behalf of
the corporation.'
In other words, the board in 1927 in
a somewhat equivocal resolution had impliedly authorized
the president in 1939 to sue the treasurer! The merits of
this rationale can perhaps best be seen by contrasting with
it the opinion of Judge Conway in Sterling Industries, dinc.
v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp."5
In Sterling, the corporation, again composed of equal
interests, had been formed largely to serve as exclusive sales
agent for the Ball Bearing Pen Corp., which owned half
the shares. After plaintiff corporation had expended considerable amounts in advertising, and had obtained orders
for 300,000 pens, the Ball Bearing Pen Corp. breached the
agency contract. The issue of suit for specific performance
was brought up at a board meeting, and not surprisingly
resulted in a tie. The president filed suit anyway. The
New York Court of Appeals held against the president,
arguing that there could be no longer any actual or implied
authority (and rejecting the applicability of presumptive
authority) after the tie in the board.
Judge Conway
reasoned that the parties by setting up an evenly divided
board had intended that no action be taken without a
majority vote. Since suit was an affirmative action, it was
barred by the deadlock.
The two opinions set one another off nicely. They
crystalize the real crux of the problem: in agency theory,
what effect does a tie vote have? At first glance, Judge
Conway is right. A tie vote should not create any new
poveer: authorization by less than a majority is no author1.4 Id. at 65, 9 N.E.2d at 579-80. The second decision dealt with some
additional matters in issue, and entered a final decree forbidding any
further interference with the president's conduct as general manager, except
through a majority action of the board. The third decision ordered the
treasurer to pay out moneys for actions taken by the president after the
board deadlocked on their merits. Most noteworthy here was the sanctioning of his right to hire a general counsel (no doubt desirable in view of
all prior litigation!) at a salary of $1250 per month. 305 Mass. at 219-20,
25 N.E.2d at 336.
135 298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d 790 (1949); accord, Motor Terminals. Inc.
v. National Car Co., 92 F. Supp. 155 (D. Del. 1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d 732
(3d Cir. 1950).
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ization at all.

Halting analysis with this statement would

leave Sterling justified

"

-in

the court's interpretation of

the facts. But this interpretation can be readily faulted.
The basis for finding a pre-existing authority in Lydia
Pinkham was the resolution creating supervisory powers in
the president. In Sterling the by-laws clothed the president
with power to sign and make all contracts and agreements
in the name of the corporation, 137 which can easily be construed as conveying authority as well to execute the contracts made. The suit here was for specific performance,
not for damages. Could not an action for specific performance be reasonably interpreted as an execution of the
original contract? The Court of Appeals took a similar
tack in the Paloma Frocks decision, discussed later, when
it held the president able to exercise an arbitration clause.
which had been previously authorized, despite a tacit deadlock. Such an implication is really no more far-reaching
than the one in Lydia Pink/tam.
Following this avenue of approach, we have a preexisting power of the president to execute a contract, rather
than a new power to sue. Then our agency question turns
chameleon, and becomes: is prohibition by less than a
majority any prohibition at all? "38 In this shifted perspective, Sterling is wrong; Lydia Pinkham right.
Or is it? Let us return to the essence of implied
authority: the agent acts reasonably to fulfill the principal's
intention in accord with the principal's manifestations to
him. However equivocal a tie vote may appear to be, it is
totally unequivocal in one key respect-it manifests indecision. On what basis can the president as agent claim
his implied authority should continue-when he has a clear
manifestation that his principal is undecided on the specific
point? 131 A Canadian court put it well: "In this case there
136 This was the conclusion in Prunty, Business Associations, 1957 Survey
of N.Y. Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1387, 1392 (1957).
137 Sterling Indus., Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 273 App. Div. 460,
462, 77 N.Y.S.2d 691, 693 (1st Dep't 1948), rev'd, 298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d

790 (1949).
13-8 The conclusion reached, in the form of a rhetorical question, in
381 (3d ed. 1959).

& JENNINGS, CASES ON CORPORATIONS
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Note that only the immediate principal, the board, is undecided.

LATTIN

This

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 37

are no authorized officers-not for the purpose in hand. The
board of directors has not acted." 140 By this logical exercise, it seems certain that vote by less than a majority
is a prohibition-when the issue is the continuation of
implied authority. On this flip of the coin, Sterling is
right and Lydia Pinkham (as well as Paloma Frocks)
wrong.
But is there no other form of authorization available
than implied agency? Authorization could come in the
form of a statute-an imputed or compulsory agency. North
Carolina has such a statute: "The president has authority
to institute or defend legal proceedings when the directors
are deadlocked." 141 Louisiana, as we have previously noted,
gives power to the president, vice-president or manager to
sue.' 42 This has been quite reasonably construed to mean
that the denial of authority by the board must be affirmative,
and hence a tie vote will not suffice.'4" Statutes such as
these would effectually resolve the problem, but it is rather
unlikely that legislatures, preoccupied with more weighty
matters, will ever take the effort to enact them.
Absent a statute, and sticking to the traditional agency
theory of implied authority, we are constrained to deny
the president the right to litigate. But theory too ethereal
has a way of yielding to reality. This pragmatic sense
was dryly conveyed by a lower New York court in the
remark: "It would be most unfortunate for a corporation
with a deadlocked board of directors if no one had the

indecision cannot take away express authority if there is any which may
be clearly derived from the ultimate principal, the corporation. Thus, if
the by-laws give the president power to sue, indecision indicated by tie vote
on an amendment to withdraw that power does not prevent the president's
power from continuing. The status is the same as where the president's
authority is derived from an express statutory grant. See notes 141. 142
infra.
140It re Rothlish Investments Ltd., 8 West. Weekly R. (n.s.)
(1953)
334, 336, 61 Man. 195, (Q.B.) (vice-president cannot sue the president
in the corporation's name when each control half the board).
141 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-34c (1960).
14 2
LA. REV. STAT. § 12:35g (1951).
143 Pierson v. Victory Industrial Life Ins. Co., 18 La. App. 327, 134
So. 425 (1931) (per curiam).
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power to employ an attorney." "I In that decision a corporation in deadlock stood to lose substantially in condemnation proceedings for inability to agree on a counsel
to represent it. On the last possible day the president
hired an attorney, who defended the firm's interests quite
satisfactorily. The court upheld this action, even though
it cited no agency theory to permit it to do so. Far from
disavowing this decision, Judge Conway in Sterling went
to great pains to find (unfortunately probably erroneous14 6
ly) 145 that there was no such emergency warranting action.
A realistic appraisal of Lydia Pinkham suggests that the
chaotic fiscal status that would have resulted in the corporation through failure to find authority in the president
was the essential motivating force there, rather than the
twelve-year old resolution, which has much the look of a
deus ex machina.
If pragmatic necessity requires a finding of power to
sue, what new theoretical justification can be found? There
is only one: inherent agency. Through this technique the
logical dilemma of a director's impasse can be circumvented.
In implied authority we reason from the manifested indecision of the president's immediate principal, the board,
and grind to a halt. In inherent authority, as Elblum and
West View Hills later make quite clear, we look beyond
the immediate principal of the board to the ultimate principal, the corporate entity itself. The president, so long
as he retains the functional leadership of the corporate
structure, derives authority independent of the board. This
indigenous authority accrues to him in virtue of his office,
47
in order to secure the operative vitality of the corporation.1
144Matter of Bernheimer, 4 Misc. 2d 503, 506, 43 N.Y.S2d 300, 302
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 266 App. Div. 868, 43" N.Y.S.2d 277 (2d Dep't 1943).
145 Since the Sterling corporation was formed chiefly to market Ball
Bearing's pens, the breach of the sales agency contract obviously represented
a serious crisis for the corporation, and in the face of this Judge Conway's
declaration that the corporation was still selling other merchandise is not
convincing proof of the absence of crisis. Cf. 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRPOATIONS:
LAW AND PRAcTicE § 8.06 n.61 (1958).
140 298 N.Y. at 492-93, 84 N.E.2d at 794.
147The author has been asked whether the president does not have his
authority implied by virtue of his appointment to office under normal bylaws, i.e., implied from the ultimate principal, the corporation, rather than

70

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 37

Recognition of such independent substantive authority

does raise a serious question: does this not in effect violate
the universal statutory mandate that a corporation is to
be managed by its board? A frank answer is yes, but only
to a limited extent and for good cause. Judge Conway
urged in Sterling that this recognition amends the statute
to read that a corporation is to be managed by its board of

directors, except in deadlock when it is managed by the
president. 14 8 What he overlooks is that the Sterling rule
also modifies the statute so that it reads, a corporation

is to be managed by its board of directors, except that
if a president is quick or sly enough to act before the board
deadlocks in vote, it is managed by him, but if he is too
slow or too scrupulous, it is managed by no one! A
corporation does not exist in a vacuum, and a policy of
inaction will have ultimate (perhaps fatal) effects on corporate assets as much as a policy of action. The difference

is that a policy of action is led by a president actually
supervising the daily functioning of the firm, while a policy
of inaction is no leadership at all.

A policy argument of more weight runs to this effect.
The parties in the creation of a board representing equal
interests have eo ipso bargained for a deadlock, and having
obtained one should be left to their own devices. 49 The
fatal flaw in this contention is that the state is no longer
concerned with the contracting parties in their initial con-

the board. It is true that this power is derived from the corporation, but
there is no factual basis on which to imply the authority. When the court
declares the president has power ex virtute officii, it is imputing the power
to him by force of law, and not by any implication in fact. The power is
inherent. See the discussion of West View Hills, note 180 infra and accompanying text.
148

Id. at 492, 84 N.E.2d at 794.

Professor O'Neal sees this as one of the two competing policy interests
in the adjudication of such a deadlock: "the desire to empower someone
to act in an emergency to protect the corporation's interests, ...
[versus]
a desire not to deprive participants in a closely held enterprise of veto
power which they bargained for as a condition of their participation in the
enterprise." 2 O'NFAL, satpra note 145, § 8.06, at 104. He opts for a
compromise solution, allowing the president to sue only if the faction
creating the deadlock is acting for a "fraudulent or unfair purpose." Ibid.
I would think a court might have some difficulty in determining when a
faction is being "unfair."
149
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dition, but with a subsisting corporation. The state has
a positive interest in seeing such a corporate entity function
well, both for the social advantages of an efficacious economic
unit, and to protect possible creditors. This state concern
is already reflected in its refusal to permit the dissolution
of a deadlocked corporation when it is a profitable entity. 1 0
If in a partnership deadlock one partner can sue without
the consent of the other,1 5 why should not society impose a
similar rule on the corporation as the price the parties must
pay for the benefits of a state charter? It is eminently
sensible for a state to declare that "having once established
satisfactory arrangements for carrying on the business of
the corporation, it is but meet that less than a majority
should not be permitted to grind the corporate wheels to
a permanent stop." 152
Having concluded our dialectical examination, a final
judgment can be rendered: Sterling is wrong, Lydia Pinkham right. Sterling concentrated too narrowly on traditional
rules of agency and failed to see the inimical effects upon
the corporation itself. Lydia Pinkham saw the potential
chaos and averted it, though a faulty rationale was employed
to achieve the desired end. The true ratio decidendi for
similar cases in the future should be inherent authority,
fully warranted on policy grounds. The key policy motive
was well expressed by a relevant North Carolina opinion:
The pillars of the business are not to be pulled down while the
dispute is raging. The end in view is to enable the officers of
150 E.g., In re Radom & Neidorf, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954) ;
29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1485 (1954). Professor O'Neal of course offers an excellent coverage of this topic. 2 O'NEAL, supra note 145, §§ 9.03, 9.27-.29.
For a good student treatment, see Note, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rw. 300 (1952).
151 Hill v. Marsh, 46 Ind. 218 (1874); cf. Coggeshall v. McKenney, 114
S.C. 1, 103 S.E. 30 (1920). The issue rarely occurs in partnerships, but
this appears to be its resolution. See 2 O'NEAL, supra note 145, § 8.06 n.49.
152Thomas v. Baker, 227 N.C. 226, 229, 41 S.E.2d 842, 845 (1947). This
decision is a good analogue to our issue here, for its concern is what powers
a president should have when he holds over in office as a result of a
deadlock in elections, reflecting a general deadlock. The court concluded he
should have full powers as before the deadlock, looking to the paramount
interests of the corporation itself. Curiously enough, the president sued
in his own name, rather than in that of the corporation, as he is entitled
to do by North Carolina's statute.
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the corporation to move from dead center by reverting to the
operative conditions theretofore established and subsisting ...
and need, is to be extricated from their
What the parties want,
15 3
present tug of war.
Tacit Deadlock in the Board
The largest number of cases have arisen when the
president wishes to litigate but has good reason to know
that half the board is opposed to his doing so. Both agency
and public policy considerations are essentially the same
in such situation as in an actual deadlock. The case law
resolution is, however, somewhat more definite. The president's power to proceed is fairly secure 1) when he is
also general manager, 2) when there is grave danger to
a substantial corporate interest. In circumstances other
than these the result will depend upon whether Sterling
or West View Hills proves the more enduring precedent.
The leading decision giving authority to the officer who
has managerial authority is undoubtedly Rothman &
Schneider, Inc. v. Beckerman.'54 A close corporation, composed of equal interests, was in the process of dissolution.
By agreement the president retired from affairs, and the
secretary-treasurer acted as de facto manager, in which
capacity he prosecuted several suits for corporate debts.
The fly in the ointment came when he sued the president's
son-in-law, a former salesman, for conversion of $30,000
worth of jewelry. The defendant moved to dismiss on the
strength of an affidavit by the president that he opposed
suit.
Judge Fuld for a unanimous Court of Appeals sanctioned the suit, distinguishing Sterling on two bases. First,
in Sterling the action was directed against a defendant who
comprised in effect the other half of the board-an insider
interest-while the suit here was directed against a third
party. This aspect of the holding is dead law, since West
View Hills has subsequently allowed suit against an insider
153 Id. at

229, 41 S.E.2d at 844-45.
1542 N.Y.2d 493, 141 N.E.2d 610, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1957).
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interest. 5 ' The second distinction was the absence of a
formal tie vote. "Where there has been no direct prohibition
by the board . . . the president has presumptive authority,
in the discharge of his duties, to defend and prosecute suits
in the name of the corporation." "I The purport of this is
clear. The court is declaring that an inherent authoritytermed presumptive-exists in the general manager, and
is not terminated by anything short of an actual deadlock.
Mere knowledge is no bar.
The Rothm an decision has been justified on implied
authority, indicated by the secretary-treasurer's prior suits,
17
An
continuing even in the face of the tacit deadlock. 3
explicit holding to this effect is the opinion of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court in Durfee (G Canning, Inc. v. Canning.1 1' The court sustained the validity of a judgment
procured by the president against the treasurer for a debt
owing to the corporation, even though the treasurer controlled half the board, because the president was also general
manager and had sued third parties for debts in the past
without objection from the board. This was deemed an
However unact in the ordinary course of business.
objectionable the result, the theory is awry. Such a suit
had better not be an act in the normal course of business
if the corporation is to survive very long. Authority implied
from past custom in normal circumstances cannot survive
in abnormal circumstances in tacit any more than in actual
deadlock. The president cannot but know of the board's
indecision, and loses his implied authority thereby. No,
the just result is far better understood in terms of an
inherent (presumptive) authority unaffected by deadlock
of any sort. Correctly understood, such inherent power
continues in the president "until changed by law or by a

155 In West View Hills, the dissent argued in vain for a continuation of this
rather arbitrary distinction between "insiders" and "outsiders." West View
Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344, 351, 160 N.E.2d 622, 626, 189
N.Y.S.2d 863, 868 (1959).

156 2 N.Y.2d at 497, 141 N.E.2d at 613, 161 N.Y.S2d at 121.
157

Prunty, Business Associations, 1957 Survey of N.Y. Law, 32 N.Y.U.L.

REv. 1387, 1392 (1957).

15878 R.I. 385, 82 A.2d 615 (1951).
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majority vote of the board of directors or stockholders, as
may be required." '
The resort to inherent authority has been more obvious
in the emergency situations. In Regal Cleaners . Dyers,
Inc. v. Merlis,160 two of the four directors filed an action
to place the corporation in receivership. The court declared
that ordinarily the president should be able to litigate only
with the board's express or implicit approbation. Nonetheless, it allowed him to defend, reasoning that in this
crisis someone had to act to protect the corporate interests:
"If the company is solvent, for the president not to [defend]
• . . might cause irremediable injury, or perhaps total failure
of justice to the shareholders." '
The same approach has
been utilized in other receivership actions, 162 as well as
when a substantial corporate asset is endangered.0 3
In
these cases there is no attempt to search out some source

'159Marron v. Wood, 55 N.M. 367, 376, 233 P.2d 1051, 1057 (1951),
holding a president-general manager continues in full powers during a deadlock, and, inter alia, may sue the other faction for equitable relief in the
corporation's name.
160274 Fed. 915 (2d Cir. 1921).
61
1 Id. at 917.

162Legge v. Legge. 4 D.L.R. 740, [1939] 3 West. Weekly R. 112, 47
Man. 318 (K.B.), holding that a president may defend a receivership action
brought by two of the four directors, but laying heavy stress on the
president's status as majority shareholder: cf. Golden State Glass Corp. v.
Superior Court, 13 Cal. 2d 384, 90 P.2d 75 (1939) (no deadlock; secretary
and treasurer can defend against president's receivership action). But cf.
Engstrum v. Paul Engstrum Associates, 36 Del. Ch. 19, 124 A.2d 722
(1956) (treasurer cannot defend in corporate name against president, both
owning 50% interest).
163 British Brokers. Ltd. v. Wolford, 29 Misc. 2d 997, 999, 219 N.Y.S.2d
827, 830 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (president may sue other 50% shareholder in
tacit deadlock situation where emergency exists-the emergency here being
risk to assets). The law as to lower officers is less clear. They can
probably defend on behalf of the corporation, but not sue. Gottlieb v.
Avery Realty Co., 182 La. 703, 162 So. 571 (1935), held that the secretarytreasurer, 50% owner, could defend in the corporate name a suit by the
president, the other 50% owner, to foreclose a mortgage on corporation
property. Cf. Gallagher v. Texagon Mills, Inc.. 67 F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y.
1946) (unspecified officers may offer a defense in corporate name against
a suit brought by other unspecified officers and directors). But see Sealand
Inv. Corp. v. Emprise Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 305, 12 Cal. Rep. 153 (1961)
(a secretary-treasurer without managerial authority who has 50% shareholder control cannot sue the president and other 50% interest for diversion
of corporate assets, as this is no emergency); M. & E. Luncheonette, Inc.
v. Freilich, 30 Misc. 2d 637, 218 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (essentially
same holding).
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for implied authority, but simply the frank avowal that
it is necessary to grant the power to protect the corporation.
The much-cited New Jersey decision, Elblum Holding

Corp. v. Mintz,"e contributes an opinion quite illuminating
in its indication of how far necessity can incite inherent
authority to expand the powers of the ordinary president.
A corporation controlled half by its president and half
by its treasurer

owned substantial property which was

leased to the treasurer.

Though the corporation was debt-

ridden, the treasurer refused to pay back rents, and con-

siderable acrimony arose within the corporation thereby.
Finally the president brought suit. The interesting wrinkle

is that the by-laws limited the powers of the president to
essentially clerical tasks, and to serving as moderator and
chairman of the board. The court nonetheless expressly
held the power of the president to bring suit inherent, a
capacity incidental to his office as such. Significantly, the
justification it found for this inherent power lay in the
president's fiduciary duties to the corporation as such:
[I]n reason and justice, he may employ and authorize counsel to
institute necessary legal proceedings for the . . . purpose of
preserving the interests of his corporation. . . . If the president
were to fail to exercise the power to protect and defend the assets
of his corporation, he5 might well be liable to his corporation for
the resultant losses.'1

Remaining to be noted is the law in circumstances
where no serious jeopardy to the corporation or its assets
is involved. All the cases here are from New York, 66
120 N.J.L. 604, 1 A2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
165Id. at 609-10, 1 A.2d at 207. The Elblum case has inspired the best
student note in this area, The Role of the Corporation in Litigation Caesed
by Factional Disputes Among Directors, 48 YALE L.J. 1082 (1939). The
note discerns that the rationale here cannot be implied authority: "tradi164

tional rules of agency .

.

. appear to break down; for the very existence

of the impasse would seem to be notice to the world that the president does
not have implied authority to act for the corporation." Id. at 1084. It
deems the undefined power to sue one provoked by crisis, id. at 1084-85, and
concludes that its use is practical and desirable because it can protect both
shareholders and creditors. Id. at 1088.
166 Except for one real novelty, a pre-annexation decision from the Kingdom of Hawaii, Waikapu Sugar Co. v. Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Co.,
8 Hawaii 343 (1892). The president of a peculiar corporation without a
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and reflect the trend from Sterling to West View Hills.
In the years 1949-1957, the lower courts invariably followed
Sterling and disallowed presidential authority wheli a tacit
deadlock existed. 1 1 7 Then came Paloma Frocks, Inc. v.
A contract existed betveen
Shamokin Sportswear Corp.'
the two firms guaranteeing arbitration of certain disputes.
When a dispute actually arose, the president of Shamokin
knew that it would be an "idle gesture" to request the
board, half composed of Paloma's representatives, to seek
arbitration. He went ahead and asserted the arbitration
clause, and the Court of Appeals upheld him. The rationale,
as in Rothman, was that there had been no direct prohibitiou
by the board, and therefore the prior contract served to
provide him with implied authority. The result is perfectly
sound, but the same caveat is made as before that this
properly is an instance of inherent (presumptive) authority.
The effect of West View Hills should make it clear
in New York that a president may sue in a tacit deadlock under any circumstances-crisis or not, prior suit or
none, insider or outsider suit. A lower court has quite
properly so held even when the president deliberately refrained from calling a board meeting because he knew
a deadlock would result. The president could sue: his
presumptive powers prevailed since there was no "formal
interdiction." 169

board of directors was held unable by virtue of his office alone to sue
defendant, a corporation composed of the same parties who owned 50%
of the plaintiff corporation's shares.
167 Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 532
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953);
Tidy-House Paper Corp. v. Adiman, 4 App. Div. 2d 619, 168 N.Y.S.2d 448
(1st Dep't 1957) ; Kardwheel Corp. v. Karper, 1 Misc. 2d 707, 148
N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Legion Against Vivisection v. Grey, 63
N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (pre-Sterling).
1683 N.Y.2d 572, 147 N.E.2d 779, 170 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958).
169 Berma Management Corp. v. 140 W. 42nd St. Realty, Inc., 21 Misc. 2d
571, 197 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct. 1960); cf. British Brokers, Ltd. v. Wolford,
supra note 163, which reads West View Hills as allowing suit only in
emergency situations. I find no basis in the [Vest View Hills opinion to
justify this construction.
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Tacit Opposition of the Board
West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp.' has
been adverted to so often that a formal brief seems almost
anticlimatic. But the opinion merits close attention, since
it represents a major advance in corporate concepts and
would appear to be7 1 the foundation stone for the building
of future case law.
The facts are simply stated. The president was one
of three directors in a long-dormant close corporation. While
the corporation was active, he had directed its litigation,
but no by-law gave him explicit authority to do so. In
the present law suit, the president sued another corporation
for alleged misappropriation of funds in a realty transaction.
Since the other two directors were in control of the defendant corporation, they clearly opposed suit. But, as
is not unexpected in a dormant corporation, there was
no board vote against suit. To this writer at least, there
is an uncomfortable aura about the whole affair, that suggests the president was not altogether altruistic in suing.
This only has the effect, however, of making the actual
holding that much stronger.
In a five-to-two decision, with Judge Dye writing for
the majority, the Court of Appeals recognized in the president the power to sue. The opinion centers on two propositions: 1) "a corporate entity has independent, separate
legal rights" 172 from those of the board or shareholders;
2) the president has the power and the duty to sue to
protect these rights, absent express prohibition. The dissent
by Judge Froessel (with Chief Judge Conway, who wrote
Sterling's opinion, concurring) challenges the decision as
1706 N.Y.2d 344, 160 N.E.2d
171 West View Hills has been

622, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1959).
expressly followed so far in Custer Channel
Wing Corp. v. Frazer, 181 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Maryland law)
(president may sue though at least half, and maybe more of the directors
oppose it); British Brokers, Ltd. v. Wolford, 29 Misc. 2d 997, 219 N.Y.S2d
827 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Berma Management Corp. v. 140 W. 42nd St. Realty,
Inc., supra note 169; Ace Tackless Corp. v. Fuhrman, 22 Misc. 2d 38, 193
N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (president may sue defendants who constitute
two-thirds of the board and the majority shareholders).
1726 N.Y.2d at 347, 160 N.E.2d at 624, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
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"counter to the basic principles of corporate law," "I and
contends that the president cannot have presumptive authority over litigation when he has actual knowledge of the
opposition of a majority of the directors.
The policy key to West View Hills is the stress on the
existence of independent legal rights and interests of the
corporation as such. This stress is warranted. A cause of
action is in a sense an intangible corporate asset. It has the
potentiality of creating a judgment beneficial to the material
assets or intangible well-being of the corporation. Majority
stockholders cannot prevent minority interests from realizing
this asset since every stockholder has a right to employ
the stockholder's derivative action.
Now the Court of
Appeals has declared that the unformalized opposition of
a majority of individual directors cannot prevent the president from realizing this asset on behalf of the corporation.
In effect he has been given a new means of achieving his
fiduciary task of protecting the interests of minority as
well as majority shareholders, creditors, and the generic
concern of society in having a well-functioning organization.
The fact that the president may feel the need for suit to
protect these interests, and a majority of the directors
may not, "does not deprive him of his right and duty to
perform the obligations and functions of his office as
president, nor does it prevent the corporation, as a corporation, from commencing an action in its own behalf
2

174

The dissent does not really challenge the idea that the
corporation has independent legal rights which should be
protected. What Judge Froessel does assert is that the
proper mode for the president to employ is the shareholder's derivative suit, a theory also propounded by
Sterling.1 75 But this alternative is not altogether satisfactory. Its drawbacks have been detailed elsewhere,'
173 Id. at 348, 160 N.E.2d at 625, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
174 Id. at 347, 160 N.E.2d at 624, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 865.

175 Sterling Indus., Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483, 493,
84 N.E.2d 790, 794 (1949).
176The limitations of the shareholder's derivative action are carefully
detailed in an excellent student comment on West View Hills, 34 ST. JoHN's
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notably the absence of a jury trial, bond posting requirements, the heavier burden of proof, and the substantial protection accorded the directors under the business judgment
rule. It is rather significant that this alternative of the
shareholder's derivative suit was not given much weight
The director's
by either Lydia Pinkham or Elblum.'7
statutory suit is somewhat more suitable, but it exists only
in New York and Michigan,' 8 the president might have to
bear the expenses if unsuccessful, and the suit is available
only for causes of action
running essentially against other
79
directors or officers.'
Since these other modes of suing in the corporate interest do exist, imputation of power in the president to sue
when a majority of individual directors are opposed is
certainly not crucial. But the president is, after all, in a
different status than a shareholder or even a director. He
is normally the functional head of the corporation, supervising its general administration, and burdened with a
fiduciary obligation toward its over-all welfare. He may
well therefore have a stronger motivation to sue than any
other single person in the corporate structure; specifically
he may have a greater grasp of the urgency of suit than
any individual director. If the feelings of the individual
directors do not run deep, the managerial discretion of
the president may well be trusted; if they do run deep, the
directors can readily check the president. Altogether,
though not indispensable, the power of the president here
is desirable.
To complete the academic picture, there can be no
serious doubt that this power is an inherent one. The
majority opinion in West View Hills explicitly declared
L. REv. 330, 331-33 (1960).
Sterling's reliance upon it as a reasonable
alternative was criticized in 2
'NFAL, CLOSE CoRPoRATIoNs: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 8.06 n.61 (1958).

17 Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 298 Mass. 53, 65, 9 N.E.2d
573, 579-80 (1937); Elblun Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 120 NJ.L. 604, 609,
1 A.2d 204, 206 (1938).
178N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §§60, 61 (Supp. 1960); MIcH ComP. LAWS

§ 450.47 (1948).

279 Note, Director's Statutory Action in New York, 36 N.Y.U.L. REa. 199,

215-16 (1961).
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that the omission to include power in the president over
litigation in the charter or by-laws is irrelevant, as it will
be implied 180 -and
clearly implied as a matter of law,
and not of fact. The court again enunciated the legal
proposition that "absent a provision in the by-laws or action
by the board of directors prohibiting the president from
defending and instituting suit in the name of and in behalf
of the corporation, he must be deemed, in the discharge
of his duties, to have presumptive authority to so act." 181
The dissent argued that presidential power disappeared in
the face of knowledge of opposition by a majority of directors, indicating they viewed the presumption involved
8 2
as some species of implied authority."
The majority did
not adopt this interpretation; prohibition now equals an
actual majority vote against action, and that alone. Altogether, the language and the holding could not more
clearly evidence the fact that this authority is inherent,
imputed in law rather than derived in fact.
The most weighty objection to the West View Hills
rule is the possibility of abuse by the president. One might
legitimately feel that the president should have power to
proceed to litigate when the board is deadlocked (i. e., hold
Sterling as wrong) and still have serious reservations of
the wisdom of allowing the president to proceed when most
directors as individuals object (i. e., feel TVest View Hills
is equally wrong). Does it not infringe too much on the
powers of the board, and present too excessive a temptation
for the president who may see a golden opportunity to
advance his own selfish interests without personal expense?"'
The dissenters argued that the net effect was
1806 N.Y.2d at 346, 160 N.E.2d at 623, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 864: "[U]nless
the president actually or impliedly possess such power the corporate interests
may be prejudiced if not entirely destroyed. . . . [A]n ommission [to include the power to sue in the by-laws] does not mean that the power is nonexistent for, in situations requiring the exercise of such power to preserve
and protect the interests of the corporation, it will be implied." This is
certainly according the power by law, and not deriving it by factual
implication.
181 Id. at 348, 160 N.E.2d at 624, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
182 Id. at 351. 160 N.E.2d at 626, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
183 See the critical conclusion reached in 34 ST. JoHiN's L. Rv. 330. 338
(1960).
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that "the corporation shall be managed by its board of

directors, except when one member of the board, who happens to be president, disagrees with the majority, in which

case it shall be managed by the president." 184 This overstates the case. Limiting the analysis for the moment to
the situation prior to suit, there is one simple and totally
effective limit.

The board can convene a special session and

rescind the president's powers by explicit decree. Further,
even after suit has commenced, the board can for good
cause (in some states, without cause) strip him of his office,

and recover damages for any breach of fiduciary duty involved, should the case be so extreme.
The one genuine forerunner of the West View Hills
case, namely Colman v. West Virginia Oil & Oil Land Co.,'

now becomes relevant. This opinion, hitherto neglected,
is sound despite its age. A third party had won a verdict
in a bitter law suit with the 'West Virginia Oil Company.
The vice-president, who was acting president. ordered dis-

missal of an appeal.

Appellate counsel, acting under a

letter from one director who claimed that five of the nine

directors wished the appeal prosecuted, refused
continue.

to dis-

After deciding that there was no evidence of

fraud or collusion on the part of the vice-president, the
184 6 N.Y.2d at 352, 160 N.E.2d at 627, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
18525 W. Va. 148 (1884).
In Lucky Queen Mining Co. v. Abraham,
26 Ore. 282, 38 Pac. 65 (1894), the president of a corporation dormant
since 1877 sued a director in the corporation's name in 1893. The defendant
attacked the president's authority to sue with affidavits that all the surviving
directors except the president opposed suit. The court held the president
had nevertheless a "colorable right" to bring the action. The rationale
seems to center more on a presumotion of regularity, an idea previously
discussed in this article, than on a formal imputation of inherent authority.
Re Petrie Mfg. Co., [1923] 4 D.L.R. 60 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, [1924] 4
D.L.R. 1308, 4 Can. Bankr. Ann. 311 (Sup. Ct.) is also worthy of mention.
The president, after serious disputes among the directors, hired solicitors to
advise on a total corporate reorganization. The president admitted he never
informed the other directors because they would have opposed the measure.
In a suit to recover the solicitors' fees, the court denied that the president
had any power to hire them. In dicta it declared that the president could
have engaged counsel to litigate or advise on matters in the normal scope
of business, but, probably much influenced by evidence of serious bad faith
and fraud on the part of the president, held that corporate reorganization
was much too unusual a subject. The only tangible result was that the
attorneys, whose good faith was not questioned, received no fees.
To
protect them a finding of inherent authority would have been warranted.
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court ordered the appeal discontinued. Its opinion positively
recognized an inherent power in the president to control
litigation whenever the charter "is silent as to the duties
and powers of its president, and he is entirely unrestrained
by any action of the board of directors ... 21

186

The purported opposition of a majority of the individual directors was assumed arguendo and disapproved
as a valid objection. The court argued: "If a majority
of the board of directors really disapproved . . . why have

they not long since met as a board and expressed their
disapproval." "8' This line of reasoning-at least limited
to the pre-suit situation-seems eminently sensible. If the
members of a board are really adamant in their objection
to litigation, a meeting is readily possible. The directors
may not really be that concerned over the merits of suit,
or upon more mature reflection prior to, or during the
course of, a board meeting may conclude that the president
is right. It is quite conceivable that a director, opposed
to suit for his own personal reasons, might find it a little
hazardous to go on record in opposition in a formal board
vote when his act can be objectively measured later in
terms of his fiduciary responsibilities. In light of such
possibilities, it seems sound to require a record- vote prior
to suit as the only means of legally ascertaining the opposition of the board. Short of that, the policy factors
before discussed should prevail to enable the president, the
operative head of corporate management, to exercise full
control of corporate litigation.
Recorded Opposition of the Board
Assume the board of directors by record vote opposes
the instigation or defense of an action before the president
has had opportunity to act. 'Clearly his express or implied
authority terminates, but does his inherent authority? There
is no case in point. It does not seem probable at this time
that a court will create power in the office of president as
18625
W. Va. at 169.
18 7 Id. at 166.
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such to enable him to ignore the board action. The discussion of record action by the board prior to suit as a
check on the president's power in the last paragraphs was
based on this evaluation.
Certainly, if courts have been willing to impute power
to the president to act despite tacit opposition of the board,
they could also impute inherent authority to act despite
formalized board objection. The motive again would be to
protect the independent interests of the corporation as such,
and the circumstances would undoubtedly have to be extreme, as when the board vote constitutes a clear cover-up
for fraudulent dealings, grave breach of trust, or the like.
It is impossible to deny that a future court, confronted
with an open case of board misbehavior or even unusual
obtuseness, may feel impelled to extend West View Hills
to allow suit. But it is doubtful that any court today
would (or should) go that far. The availability of shareholder derivative and director's statutory suits would probably be deemed adequate to protect corporate interests in
such circumstances, a fortiori so where the dispute between
the board and president is merely one as to the advisability
of suit, without overtones of fraud or misconduct. To
recognize in the president a power to disregard an existing
board mandate appears too radical a reorganization of
corporate powers.
But what if the president, as in the West View Hills
situation, sues, and then the board by formal record vote
demands the withdrawal of suit. The clash of interests
becomes acute indeed. On the one hand, if the president
be allowed to continue the suit, the board of directors has
wholly lost control of the corporation in this matter. There
is no direct way the board may then check the dishonest
or irresponsible president. On the other hand, if the board
can so easily block the suit, West View Hills has been
rendered largely ineffectual. What value is the presidential
power to sue to protect corporate interests if the board
can so quickly and effectively vitiate the action? The power
becomes illusory, and the recognition of an independent
corporate interest a meaningless gesture.
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In fact, the story of the 'West View Hills corporation
did not end with the Court of Appeals decision. The board
of directors did promptly meet, remove the president from
office, and order withdrawal of suit. As West View was
a Connecticut corporation, the president then sued in that
jurisdiction for an injunction to prevent the board from
withdrawing the original action. The Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors in Zaubler v. West View Hills, Inc.,'88
unanimously barred the board from halting the suit. The
holding rested simply on the need to avoid nullifying the
protection granted the corporation by the New York decision: "Obviously, West View's right to institute an action
is of little efficacy or value if the trial of the action can
thus be thwarted." "I Doctrinally, this outcome of Zaubler
reinforces the conclusion that the presidential power is
inherent. The president's authority to sue on behalf of
the corporation not only subsists in the face of record
adverse vote of the board, but even after the board has
sought to remove the president from office. The ex-president,
says Zaubler, when no one else moves to protect the corporate
rights, does not lack the requisite interest to do so.'
This represents a startling inroad on the traditional authority of the board to manage the corporation.
A 1926 Louisiana case, St. Bernard Trappers' Ass'n r.
Michel,'9 came to the opposite conclusion. The board of
directors had leased certain valuable corporation trapping
rights. After a public meeting of various indignant stockholders, the president sued to set aside the lease. The
board met, accepted the president's resignation (which he
later endeavored to retract), and ordered the end of the
suit.
The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the board.
The president's power to sue, even though imputed to him

188 148
to avoid
189 Id.
190 Id.

Conn. 540, 172 A.2d 604 (1961) (hereinafter referred to as Zaubler,
confusion with the New York West View Hills opinion).
at -, 172 A.2d at 606.
at -, 172 A.2d at 607.
191162 La. 366, 110 So. 617 (1926) ; ef. Hertz v. Quinn & Kerns, Inc.,
21 Misc. 2d 227, 195 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (director may not
defend suit on promissory note in corporate name if majority of board has
decided no valid defense exists).
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in virtue of the Louisiana statute, could not withstand the
recorded opposition of the board, "who are charged under
the charter and under the law with the management of the
affairs of the corporation." 192 There is much to be said
for this solution. It constitutes a complete check on the
unscrupulous president; he loses his power. It retains the
traditional weight of managerial power in the board. But,
on the other side, it also constitutes a complete check on
the honest president. And it precludes any protection- by
him of the independent interests of the corporation.
It is this decisive policy consideration which motivates
West View Hills and Zaubler, and provides their justification: the theory that "a corporate entity has independent,
separate legal rights. . . ., 1. The St. Bernard Trappers'
opinion did not recognize such a distinct interest, identifying
the board of directors with the corporation as "the real and
only interested plaintiff" having control of the suit with
"the right to discontinue it at any time. . . . ,1
But in
West View Hills, the president was allowed to sue precisely
because he has the power and duty under law to preserve
and protect the interests of the corporation. And the Zaubler
opinion also goes to some pains to distinguish the interests
of the corporation from those of the board or of the
president, concluding that "the rights of West View, as a
corporation, were a proper subject of equitable protection
.... ,195
It would seem, in the final analysis, that if the
president be deemed empowered to sue to protect the corporate interests regardless of tacit board opposition, he
ought to be allowed to continue that suit even after the
board has formalized its opposition in vote. The same corporate interests should continue to be decisive.
The radical character of this inherent power may however be soundly limited by confining it to situations as in
Zaubler. The court declared expressly that the reason why
the directors could not bar the action was that an obvious
162 La. at 374, 110 So. at 619.
1936 N.Y.2d at 347, 160 N.E2d at 624, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
194 162 La. at 375, 110 So. at 620.
192

195 148 Conn. at -,

172 A.2d at 607.
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conflict of interests existed. The directors were in effect
the defendants, and as such should not be allowed "to avoid
all liability, regardless of the merits of West View's
claims, by the simple expedient of utilizing their power as
directors to withdraw West View's suit against themselves." 196 The implication is that the directors might well
be able to bar pending suits in whose outcome they are
not personally interested. Relevant here is the 1889 New
York Court of Common Pleas opinion in Recamier Mfg.
Co. v. Seymour.'97 The president, who owned 968 of the
1,000 shares, filed suit to halt the majority directors from
withdrawing money from the corporate till. The directors
promptly met and voted to terminate the suit. The court
ruled the president might still act in the name of the
corporation since the board vote contributes to, or is in itself,
a breach of trust.
Zaubler, as the logical extension of West View Hills,
demonstrates the full force of this inherent power of the
president over litigation. The president supplants the board
of directors in managing the corporation pro tanto. Whether
the need to protect the independent interests of the corporation as such warrants this new imbalance in the corporate structure remains a policy judgment. If limited to
cases where the directors allegedly are guilty of breach of
trust, or are simply involved in a conflict of interests, the
dangers do not seem unduly great. But final decision on
the merits will depend in the long run on how many
presidents rationally use, and how many irresponsibily abuse,
their inherent authority over litigation.
IV

CONCLUSION 198

It is time to draw together the scattered threads of
case law into an even doctrinal fabric. The practitioner
will want to know the practical status of the law in his
196 Id. at -, 172 A.2d at 606.
15 Daly 245 [N.Y.C.P. 1889].
198 The conclusiQns as to the power of the corporate president to obligate
the corporation by contract are presented supra and need not be repeated
here.
197
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drafting of a close corporation charter or in his advice
to a president or board member. The student will want
to possess a calculated prediction of the future evolution of
the law.
In the absence of factors of division or deadlock, the
case law pronouncedly favors the power of the president over
litigation. There is no need to spell it out in any charter
or by-law provision. If any qualms exist in a given jurisdiction prone to a narrow view of presidential powers, the
easiest solution is a clear board resolution. On the other
hand, if the president is intended to possess only nominal
status with the actual managerial authority in another, it
may be prudent in a broad rule jurisdiction to deny expressly the power over litigation. Except where such a
limitation of power exists and is brought to his attention,
any attorney whose services are sought by a corporate president can rest secure in the well-founded opinion that the
corporation will not be later able to renege on his contract
for employment. Adverse litigants will have to find more
substantial grounds for an exception than alleged want of
authority on the part of the president to retain counsel,
and victorious adversaries need not fear a concealed defect
of authority will render their judgment illusory.
In most situations, the courts will continue to use, with
justification, language of implied or apparent authority.
The reference to inherent authority or powers ex irtute
officiis will probably become more widespread, but it is
essentially immaterial whether this really occurs. The result of finding authority is what counts, not the label.
Since courts are apt to continue to use familiar language,
as implied or presumptive authority, even when the operative rationale can be nothing other than inherent authority,
the sensible attorney will employ the same language, but be
careful to keep his own conceptualizations clear.
For attorneys of corporations composed of equal shareholder and director interests, the imputation of power in
the president to sue in deadlock, whether tacit or actual,
is on the march. It is virtually certain if the president is
also general manager, has conducted suits in the past, or
can demonstrate a reasonable jeopardy of some substantial
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In New York since West View Hills, the

president will have authority whenever the board has not
actually met. Whether the Sterling rule barring suit after
an actual board deadlock will survive is a moot proposition.
Every element of its ratio decidendi-the absence of presumptive power, the undesirability of invading managerial
prerogatives, the alternative of the shareholder's derivative
suit-has been rejected by West View Hills. The only distinction left is the fact of meeting and reaching a tie vote,
as opposed to the president's knowledge of the certainty of
a tie--a distinction rightly termed "an intolerable formalism." ... A prediction of the ultimate burial of Sterling
would hardly be startling, but then intolerable formalisms
have been known to survive in the law before.
For counsel drafting a close corporation charter for
parties who seek even numbers of directors, the lesson is
plain. If the deadlock is desired to be absolute, write in a
specific clause to that effect. Of course, this may create
more problems than it solves. Counsel really concerned for
his client's welfare should better advise never entering such
a close corporation at all, if the parties must be so suspicious
from the start. It would be more realistic to work out
some form of joint venture in contractual form, or, if the
close corporation is indispensable, at the very least to
write in provisions for arbitration in case of deadlock over
litigation.
In New York, any attorney advising a president who
feels he has serious cause to sue or defend on behalf of
his corporation, but knows or suspects that a majority of
the individual directors are opposed, can reassure him as
West View Hills and
to his power to act nonetheless.
Zaubler are unlikely to be reversed in the near future, if
ever. Whether other jurisdictions will follow is less certain
-both
cases represent an extremely generous view of
presidential integrity as well as authority. Since it fits in
as the logical conclusion of the trend toward presidential

199 Prunty, Business Associations, 1959 Survey of N.Y. Law, 34 N.Y.U.L.

REv. 1433 (1959).
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authority in general, it seems quite likely that the rule will
spread. Even so, discreet counsel will advise the president
to be very sure of his justification for suit-any action many
directors oppose certainly could use some soul-searching appraisal. A prudent respect for the wrath (and imaginative
ingenuity) of a judge confronted with a flagrant abuse of
this power is always a desirable commodity. In reciprocal
manner, counsel for an individual director opposed to suit
should advise him to think twice about where the corporation's interests really lie, and if still convinced, to
convene the board at once. The board as a whole can
then take appropriate action not only to bar the suit, but
also to remove for cause or otherwise curb the over-zealous
(or ill-motivated) president. If a sho-wing of mala fides
can be made, an action for damages would certainly be
available. If the president has already begun suit, only
these latter remedies are available, but they should normally
suffice.
For the serious student of agency or corporation law,
the doctrinal development is worthy of searching appraisal.
This power of the president over litigation is a new species
of inherent authority, masquerade though it may in implied
or presumptive authority guise. It is imputed in virtue
of a concept of the president as an operative instrumentality
on behalf of the corporation as such, and not on behalf
of interests of third parties. It is possible that the courts
will find the concept, though not necessarily the actual term,
inherent authority more and more useful to expand corporate
rights and obligations through the president or managing
officer. In terms of theory of corporate structure, decisions
such as West View Hills and Zaubler suggest that the law
is beglnning to place less emphasis on its hallowed dogma
that directors manage corporations, and more on the real
resources of the office of president. Whether in the long
run there will develop a total shift of the balance of power,
so that the president's organic powers will more and more
outweigh his derivative authority, remains as yet a matter
of speculative interest.
A final word on the policy of this trend toward recogqlizing increased presidential authority. There need be little
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fear that the president is becoming the petty dictator of
the corporate entity. At any time prior to suit, his powers
can be appropriately circumscribed by an alert and functioning board. At most, in providing some exit from the paralysis of deadlock where the issue is to litigate or not, the
law is promoting the economic interests of society in having
a functional corporate entity at the expense of the parties'
putative past implied bargain for deadlock. Altogether, this
trend seems to be but a further accommodation of the law
to the facts of corporate life. Today it is almost universally
true that the president or general manager, assisted by other
officers, manages the corporation, and the directors simply
set long term patterns of growth or fiscal management,
especially with regard to stock interests. So long as the law
does not lower its standards for proper corporate conduct,
so long as it continues to hold the president to the sternest
of fiduciary obligations, there is no cause to criticize such
a mirroring of objective reality.
APPENDIX

This Appendix is a survey of all jurisdictions possessing
statutes or case law in point or closely tangential to the
issue of the powers of the corporate president over litigation.
In the states of California, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York and Texas, there were too many cases for
a complete survey, so from those jurisdictions the definitive
decisions have been selected.
FEDERAL COMMON LAW: President has authority. Regal Cleaners &
Dyers, Inc. v. Merlis, 274 Fed. 915 (2d Cir. 1921) (even in deadlock, to
defend corporate assets) ; Blue Goose Mining Co. v. Northern Light Mining
Co., 245 Fed. 727 (9th Cir. 1917) (president-general manager); Davis v.
Memphis City Ry., 22 Fed. 883 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1885).
ALABAEA: A federal court has assumed Alabama law would grant the
president authority. Ingalls Iron Works Co. v. Ingalls, 177 F. Supp. 151
(N.D. Ala. 1959), aff'd men., 280 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1960).

ARKANSAS:
Bank president has authority. Sebastian State Bank v.
Holland, 130 Ark. 59, 196 S.W. 482 (1917) (dictum); Dent v. Peoples'
Bank, 118 Ark. 157, 175 S.W. 1154 (1915) (dictum).
CALIFORNIA: President-general manager, but not the president as such,
has authority. Pacific Bank v. Stone, 121 Cal. 202, 53 Pac. 634 (1898)
(president has no authority even in emergency) ; Streeten v. Robinson, 102
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Cal. 542, 36 Pac. 946 (1894) (vice-president-general manager has authority);
Burns v. Valley Bank, 94 Cal. App. 254, 271 Pac. 107 (1928) (alternative
holding) (president-general manager has authority). See also Campbell v.
Hanford, 67 Cal. App. 155, 227 Pac. 234 (1924) (president of close corporation has authority if he has effectual shareholder control).
COLORADO: Managing officers have authority. New Mexico Potash &
Chem. Co. v. Oliver, 123 Colo. 268, 276, 228 P.2d 979, 983 (1951)
(dictum).
Uncertain. See Motor Terminals, Inc. v. National Car
DELAWARE:
Co., 92 F. Supp. 155 (D. Del. 1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1950)
(president's proper relief is shareholder's derivative suit when board deadlocks); Engstrum v. Paul Engstrum Associates, 124 A.2d 722, 723 (Del.
Ch. 1956) (treasurer has no authority, but hint in dicta that president might
be able to conduct litigation).
Bank president has authority. Russell v.
DIsTicr OF COLOUMBIA:
Washington Savings Bank, 23 App. D.C. 348 (1904).
President-general manager and bank president have authority,
GEORGIA:
but no case law on the president as such. Yatesville Banking Co. v. Fourth
Nat'l Bank, 17 Ga. App. 420, 87 S.E. 606 (1916) (memorandum decision)
(bank president); Dublin & S.W. Ry. v. Akerman & Akerman, 2 Ga. App.
746, 59 S.E. 10 (1907) (president-general manager). But see Taylor v.
Friedman Co., 152 Ga. 529, 110 S.E. 679 (1922) (president-general manager
has no authority to defend in a foreign jurisdiction).
HAwAIi: Uncertain. Compare Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Henry, 21 Hawaii
62 (1912) (defendant cannot challenge right of president to sue), with
Waikapu Sugar Co. v. Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Co., 8 Hawaii, 343
(1892) (president of rather unusual corporation cannot sue 50% of ownership).
IDAHO: Uncertain. See Weil v. Defenbach, 36 Idaho 37, 208 Pac. 1025
(1922) (president can accept service on behalf of corporation).
ILLINOIS: President has authority. Wetherbee v. Fitch, 117 Ill. 67,
7 N.E. 513 (1886) (president-general manager); Boston Tailoring House v.
Fisher, 59 Ill. App. 400 (1895) (president).
IOwA: President has no authority. Ney v. Eastern Iowa Tel. Co.,
162 Iowa 525, 144 N.W. 383 (1913) (suit against the corporation).
President has authority. Winfield Mortgage & Trust Co. v.
KANSAS:
Robinson, 89 Kan. 842, 132 Pac. 979 (1913); Citizen's Nat'l Bank v. Berry,
53 Kan. 696, 37 Pac. 131 (1894) (bank president).
President has authority. Breathitt Coal, Iron & Lumber
KENTUCKY:
Co. v. Gregory, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1507, 78 S.W. 148 (1904) (dictum); Savings
Bank v. Benton, 59 Ky. (2 Metcalfe) 240 (1859) (bank president).
President has authority by statute. LA. REv. STAT. § 12:35
LoUISIANA:
(1950). See Acadian Prod. Corp. v. Savanna Corp., 222 La. 617, 63 So. 2d
141 (1953) (applying statute).
Managing officers have authority, but the law is otherwise
MAINE:
uncertain. Bangor Say. Bank v. Wallace, 87 Me. 28, 32 Atl. 716 (1894)
(bank treasurer); Inhabitants of New Gloucester v. Bridgham, 28 Me. 60
(1848) (municipal corporation officers). But see Chabot & Richard Co. v.
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Chabot, 109 Me. 403, 84 Atl. 892 (1912) (president has no authority to
defend in corporate name against majority shareholder's derivative suit).
MARYLAND:
A federal court has assumed Maryland would grant the
president authority. Custer Channel Wing Corp. v. Frazer, 181 F. Supp. 197
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (even in tacit deadlock).
MASSACHUSETTs: President-general manager and managing officers have
authority, but the president as such does not. General Mortgage & Loan
Corp. v. Guaranty & Sec. Corp., 264 Mass. 253, 162 N.E. 319 (1928)
(general manager) ; Kelly v. Citizens Fin. Co., 306 Mass. 531, 28 N.E.2d
1005 (1940) (president cannot even defend on behalf of corporation). See
Trustees of Smith Charities v. Connolly, 157 Mass. 272, 31 N.E. 1058
(1892) (president-general manager). But see Alden Bros. v. Dunn, 264 Mass.
355, 162 N.E. 773 (1928) (suit by president as such deemed ratified by
board).
President has authority. Sarmiento v. Davis Boat & Oar
MICHIGAN:
Co., 105 Mich. 300, 63 N.W. 205 (1895).
MINNE soTA: President has authority. Dickinson v. Citizens' Ice & Fuel
Co., 139 Minn. 201, 165 N.W. 1056 (1918) (alternative holding); Traxler
v. Minneapolis Cedar & Lumber Co., 128 Minn. 295, 150 N.W. 914
(1915).
MIssouRI:
President-general manager, managing officers, and probably
the president as such all have authority. Leggett v. Mutual Commerce Cas.
Co., 250 S.W.2d 995 (Mo. 1952) (per curiam) (president-general manager);
.Turner v. Chillicothe & D.M.C. R.R., 51 Mo. 501 (1873) (president);
Becker v. National Ref. Co., 50 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932) (managing
officer).
NEBRASKA: Managing officers have authority. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
Field, 2 Neb. 442, 89 N.W. 249 (1902).
NEVADA: President has authority. Reno Water Co. v. Leete, 17 Nev.
203, 30 Pac. 702 (1882); Ricord v. Central Pac. R.R., 15 Nev. 167
(1880).
NEW HAMIPSHIRE: Uncertain, but at least bank cashier has authority.
Eastman v. Coos Bank, 1 N.H. 23 (1817).
NEW JERSEY:

President has authority.

Elblum Holding Corp. v. Mintz,

120 N.J.L. 604, 1 A.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (even in tacit deadlock); Beebe
v. George H. Beebe Co., 64 N.J.L. 497, 46 Atl. 168 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
President-general manager has authority. Marron v.
NEW MEXICO:
Wood, 55 N.M. 367, 233 P.2d 1051 (1951).
NEW YORK: President has authority. Twyeffort v. Unexcelled Mfg.
Co., 263 N.Y. 6, 188 N.E. 138 (1933)

(president-general manager); Potter

v. New York Infant Asylum, 44 Hun. 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1887), aff'd mem.,
118 N.Y. 684, 23 N.E. 1147 (1890)

(president).

Compare Hillcrest Paper

Co. v. Ohlstein, 10 Misc. 2d 286, 172 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mere.,
6 App. Div. 2d 864, 175 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1st Dep't 1958) (sole remaining
active officer may sue), with American Water-Works Co v. Venner, 18 N.Y.
Supp. 379 (1st Dep't 1892) (vice-president may not sue even in emergency).
NORTH CAROLINA: President by statute has authority to sue when the
board of directors is deadlocked. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-34c (Supp. 1957).
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President-general manager, managing officer, and bank
OKL.AHOMA:
presidents have power to sue. Municipal Gas Co. v. Zachry, 146 Okla. 203,
294 Pac. 114 (1930) (president-general manager); Negim & Co. v. Harp,
98 Okla. 261, 225 Pac. 347 (1924) (acting general manager); National
Bank v. Earl, 2 Okla. 617, 39 Pac. 391 (1895) (bank president).
OREGON: President-general manager has authority. Lucky Queen Min.
Co. v. Abraham, 26 Ore. 282, 38 Pac. 65 (1894).
President has authority. Campbell v. Pittsburg Bridge
PENNSYLVANIA:
Co., 23 Pa. Super. 138 (1903).
RHODE ISLAND: President-general manager has authority, and perhaps
the president does also. Durfee & Canning, Inc. v. Canning, 78 R.I. 385,
82 A2d 615 (1951) (president-general manager). See also De Pasquale v.
Societa De M.S. Maria, 54 R.I. 399, 173 AtI. 623 (1934) (indicating that
in a prior suit the president sued the other officers in the name of the
society).
SOUTH CAROLINA: President has authority. Freeman v. King Pontiac
Co., 236 S.C. 335, 114 S.E.2d 478 (1960) (even to countermand geiferal
manager).
Smith v. McKee,
SOUTH DAKOTA: Bank president has authority.
55 S.D. 572, 226 N.W. 766 (1929).
TEXAS:

President and managing officers have authority. Thrift Packing

Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 191 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1951) (applyihg
Texas law) (president); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. James, 73 Tex. 12, 1a SA.
744 (1889) (general manager); Bounds v. Stephenson, 187 S.W. 1031 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1916)

(president-general manager).

President has authority, at least in emergency. Kamas Sec. Co.
v. Taylor, 119 Utah 241, 226 P.2d 111 (1950).
VIRGINIA: A federal court has assumed that Virginia would grant the
president a presumption of authority. Mardel Sec., Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette
Corp., 183 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Va. 1960).
WASHINGTON: President and managing officers have authority. Twohy
v. Slate Creek Mining Co., 31 Wash. 2d 668, 198 P.2d 832 (1948); Lycette
v. Green River Gorge, Inc., 21 Wash. 2d 859, 153 P.2d 873 (1944) (even in
suit against a director) ; McKevitt v. Golden Age Breweries, Inc., 14 Wash. 2d
50, 126 P.2d 1077 (1942) (treasurer-general counsel); Fernald v. Spokane
& B.C. Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 Wash. 672, 72 Pac. 462 (1903) (per curiam)
(vice-president in emergency).
WEST VIRGINIA: President has authority. Colman v. West Virginia
Oil & Oil Land Co., 25 W. Va. 148 (1884); First Nat'l Bank v. Kimberlands,
16 W. Va. 555, 579 (1880) (dictum) (bank president).
President and managing officers have authority, at least
WIscONSIN:
in emergency. Sigman v. General Drivers Union, 5 Wis. 2d 6, 92 N.W.2d
219 (1958) (president and general manager) ; Central Shorewood Bldg. Corp.
v. Saltzstein, 245 Wis. 138, 13 N.W.2d 525 (1944) (general manager);
Green Bay Fish Co. v. Jorgenson, 165 Wis. 548, 163 N.W. 142 (1917)
(president).
UTAH:

